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Yuval Feldman, Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Haggai Porat, Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal?, 47 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2022-2023).

ALWD 7th ed.
Yuval Feldman, Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Haggai Porat, Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal?, 47 Law & Psychol. Rev. 1 (2022-2023).

APA 7th ed.
Feldman, Yuval, Kricheli-Katz, Tamar, & Porat, Haggai. (2022-2023). Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal?. Law & Psychology Review, 47, 1-38.

Chicago 18th ed.
Feldman, Yuval, Kricheli-Katz, Tamar, and Porat, Haggai. 2022-2023. "Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal?." Law & Psychology Review 47: 1-38. HeinOnline.

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AGLC 4th ed.
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MLA 9th ed.
Feldman, Yuval, et al. "Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal?." Law & Psychology Review, 47, 2022-2023, pp. 1-38. HeinOnline.

OSCOLA 5th ed.
Yuval Feldman, Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Haggai Porat, 'Are All Types of Discrimination Created Equal?' (2022-2023) 47 Law & Psychol Rev 1 Export To:

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ARE ALL TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION CREATED EQUAL?

*Yuval Feldman, Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Haggai Porat**

In this project, we use an experimental approach to investigate whether all types of discrimination are created equal, disentangling the different mechanisms that generate discrimination. In our study, a large random sample of Jewish Israelis played four games with partners belonging to a disadvantaged social group, identified by gender (women), race (Arabs), religion (ultra-Orthodox Jews), or ethnicity (Mizrahi Jews). A dictator game assessed negative emotions and inclinations for fairness; a trust game explored mistrust; a competence game examined beliefs about competence and intelligence; and a donation game was used to investigate beliefs about entitlement. Arabs, the racial minority group, were the most discriminated against across all the domains measured in the different games. Ultra-Orthodox Jews were discriminated against in the dictator game but were favored in the trust game, suggesting a more nuanced attitude towards this religious group. Women were generally favored, compared to men, across all four games. Our findings suggest that anti-discrimination laws, which in most countries apply a unified approach to eliminating all forms of ethnic, gender, and religion-based discrimination, may not be effective because each of these forms of discrimination is generated by a different behavioral mechanism. Thus, our project makes two important contributions to the empirical study of anti-discrimination law. First, we offer an innovative methodology for disentangling the different mechanisms that generate discrimination, which could help policymakers design more tailored and effective anti-discrimination laws. Second, we document differences in the types of discrimination directed at different social groups in a modern heterogeneous society, a current global challenge.

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* Yuval Feldman is the Mori Lazarof Professor of Legal Research at Bar-Ilan Faculty of Law and Associate Dean for Research. Tamar Kricheli-Katz is an Associate Professor at Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law. Haggai Porat is the Ari J. Zweiman Olin Fellow in Law and Economics and SJD Candidate at Harvard Law School and a Ph.D. Candidate at the Tel Aviv School of Economics. We thank Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Ariel Porat, Tali Regev, Dan Simon, Tom Zur, and participants in the twelfth Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (at Cornell Law School), in the second Biennial Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe (at KU Leuven Faculty of Law), and in the faculty seminars at the Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law, for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Dana Bublil, Bonnie Cherry, and Donna Zamir for valuable research assistance. The project was funded with the generous support of the Israeli Science Foundation and the Israel Democracy Institute. Porat is also grateful to the John M. Olin Center at Harvard Law School for financial support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

In many countries, anti-discrimination laws apply a relatively uniform approach to eliminating all forms of ethnic, gender, and religious-based discrimination.[1] This article questions the effectiveness of this uniform approach by suggesting that different mechanisms tend to generate different types of discrimination. We do so by using an experimental approach that disentangles the different mechanisms that generate discrimination against four social groups in Israel—women, Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Mizrahi Jews—which represent discrimination based on gender, race, religion, and ethnicity, respectively.

Four main forms of discrimination have been identified in the theoretical and empirical literature on discrimination. *Taste discrimination* is generated by the discriminators' positive or negative attitude toward certain social groups.[2] Taste discriminators are willing to forego material gain in order to satisfy their tastes.[3] Naturally, "taste" is not a singular emotion, but rather is composed of a potentially large number of attitudes towards members of a group, such as affection, fear, pity, perceptions of worthiness, etc. Two other forms of discrimination are *statistical discrimination*[4] and *mistaken-stereotypes discrimination*.[5] Both arise from cultural beliefs about specific social groups.[6] These beliefs may be shaped, for example, by perceptions of others' capabilities and warmth, with members of certain social groups seen as more capable or warm than members of other groups in specific

1. *See generally* Nancy M. Modesitt, *Reinventing the EEOC*, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237 (2010).

2. *See* GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 3,7 (UNIV. OF CHI. PRESS 1975); *see also Taste-Based Discrimination: How Does it Work?*, OPEN ACCESS GOV'T (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/taste-based-discrimination-how-does-it-work/94802/ ("Taste-based discrimination refers to discrimination that is due to tastes of people.").

3. *See* BECKER, *supra* note 2, at 6, 8; David Neumark, *Wage Differentials by Race and Sex: The Roles of Taste Discrimination and Labor Market Information*, 38 INDUS. REL.: J. ECON. & SOC'Y 3 (1999).

4. *See generally* Kennneth Arrow, *The Theory of Discrimination* (Princeton Univ. Indus. Rel. Working Paper, No. 30A, 1971); Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, *The Wage Penalty for Motherhood*, 66 AM. SOCIO. REV. 204, 208-10 (2001); EDMUND S. PHELPS, INFLATION POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT THEORY (1st ed. 1972).

5. *See* Chaim Fershtman & Uri Gneezy, *Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach*, 116 Q. J. ECON., 351, 354–55 (2001).

6. In using the term "cultural beliefs," we refer to learned (sometimes subconscious) shared beliefs about the respect, social esteem, and honor associated with certain types or categories of people. In the United States for example, beliefs about social esteem are also associated with beliefs about differences in ability and competence with regard to tasks that are valued by the wider society. *See* Cecilia L. Ridgeway, *Status Construction Theories, in* CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES (Peter J. Burke ed., 2006); Joseph Berger et al., *Status Characteristics and Social Interaction,* 37 AM. SOCIO. REV. 241, 241-55 (1972).

contexts.[7] When these cultural beliefs can be statistically supported by data on group averages, people who rely on those beliefs to assess an individual (without testing him or her individually) are engaging in statistical discrimination.[8] However, when cultural beliefs are not supported by group averages, people who still adhere to these beliefs are practicing mistaken-stereotypes discrimination.[9] The fourth form of discrimination under consideration is *normative discrimination*, which occurs when people act in accordance with their normative evaluations and moral judgments.[10] In this form of discrimination, people are discriminated against not because it is perceived to be costly to interact with them, but because the behaviors or ideologies associated with members of their group are perceived as normatively wrong.[11]

Research has shown that conscious and unconscious cognitive processes can interact without individuals being aware that they are in effect engaging in discrimination.[12] Crandall and Eshleman propose that a "justification-suppression model" results in either the expression or the suppression of discrimination.[13] In this model, discrimination is generated through a two-stage cognitive process.[14] In the first stage, an automatic, genuine primary prejudice is generated, in which an individual evaluates others based on their membership of a certain social group.[15] In the second stage, the expression of the individual's genuine prejudice, in the form of discriminatory behavior, is either suppressed or justified by beliefs, values, and social norms.[16]

Often, certain social groups are the target of more than one form of discrimination; empirically disentangling the four forms of discrimination can be

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7. *See generally* Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., *Warmth and Competence as Universal Dimensions of Social Perception: The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map*, 40 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 61 (2008).

8. *See* Budig & England, *supra* note 4, at 209.

9. *See* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 354–55.

10. *See* Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, *Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty*, 24 GENDER & SOC'Y 616, 617 (2010).

11. *See id.*

12. Linda H. Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, *Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment*, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1004–10 (2006) (discussing unconscious discrimination). *But see* Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, *Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading*, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 1023, 1035 (2006) (criticizing the idea that law needs to be used to regulate implicit discrimination).

13. Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, *A Justification–Suppression Model of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice*, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 414 *passim* (2003).

14. *Id.* at 416–20.

15. *Id.* at 418–20.

16. *Id.* at 419–25.

very difficult.[17] Our study assesses the occurrence of four forms of discrimination directed against four disadvantaged groups, and the variations in magnitude and occurrence: taste discrimination (specifically, the group of emotions embodied in acts of altruistic generosity towards another person); stereotypical/statistical discrimination generated by beliefs about trustworthiness; stereotypical/statistical discrimination generated by beliefs about competence; and normative evaluation of a social group (rather than a member of a group). These four forms tend to ultimately generate discrimination in the labor market as well as in other areas of life.

The disadvantaged social groups in Israel that are this article's main focus in the current study—women, Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and Mizrahi Jews—correspond with other disadvantaged social groups in the United States and elsewhere that tend to experience gender, racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination.[18] It should be noted that oftentimes, people are penalized in the labor force and in other areas of life for being members of more than one devalued social group—for example, Black or Hispanic women in the United States.[19] In this article, however, we focus only on discrimination on the basis of one salient feature of group membership, and leave questions of intersectionality for future research.

We hypothesized that different groups suffer from different forms of discrimination generated by different behavioral mechanisms. Comparing the relative magnitude of each of the mechanisms and forms of discrimination against each of the four disadvantaged groups reveals the complexity of discrimination and its variations across contexts, which calls for more nuanced, and less rigid remedial legal responses.

In our experiment, participants played four games with fictitious partners, varied by their perceived social identity. We used a dictator game to assess the set of emotions that drive altruistic behavior towards another individual (such as dislike, distrust, pity, etc.); a trust game to explore mistrust; a competence game to examine beliefs about competence and intelligence; and a donation game to

17. *See generally* Benard & Correll, *supra* note 10; Neumark, *supra* note 3.

18. Barak Ariel et al., *Ethnic and Racial Employment Discrimination in Low-Wage and High-Wage Markets: Randomized Controlled Trials Using Correspondence Test in Israel*, 9 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 113, 126 (2015). Although the categories are universal, clearly these types of discrimination are influenced by the context in which they occur. *Id.* For example, discrimination against Arabs cannot be separated from the Arab-Israeli conflict; likewise, discrimination against the ultra-Orthodox cannot be separated from this group's ideological decision not to participate in Israel's mandatory military service and in the labor force.

19. *See* IRIS BOHNET, WHAT WORKS: GENDER EQUALITY BY DESIGN 21, 65 (2016); *see also* Marina Zhavoronkova et al., *Occupational Segregation in America,* CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 29, 2022), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/occupational-segregation-in-america ("[S]egregation may be most harmful at the intersection of race and gender—for women of color.").

investigate beliefs about group entitlement. In all four games participants were compensated according to the outcomes of the games, after having been informed about the payment system in advance; therefore, they had strong incentives to behave according to their genuine emotions and beliefs.[20] Thus, the results of the experiments provide direct evidence for the various mechanisms generating discrimination within Israeli society. Given its large sample size and innovative experimental design, this study offers both the internal validity that characterizes experiments conducted in controlled settings, and the external validity accrued by studies using large and representative random samples.[21]

This project's methodological approach was inspired by that of an earlier study, by Chaim Fershtman and Uri Gneezy, which used similar games to study ethnic discrimination between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi Jews in Israel, with Israeli students serving as the experimental group.[22] While we build on the work of Fershtman and Gneezy, our study adds to it in three significant ways. First, whereas Fershtman and Gneezy focused on ethnic discrimination,[23] our study also explores sex-, race-, and religion-based discrimination.[24] This more comprehensive approach allowed us to assess the different effects of the different behavioral mechanisms on each and every type of social group. Fershtman and Gneezy's study of only one type of discrimination—ethnic discrimination—did not allow for a comparison across types of discrimination.[25] Second, their study used only the well-known dictator, trust, and ultimatum games,[26] whereas we used the first two and added two additional games, the competence and the donation games.[27] The addition of these games enabled us to investigate whether discrimination against different social groups is driven predominantly by statistical beliefs, whether accurate or inaccurate, about competence, as is often hypothesized by economists, as well as to explore the additional effects of moral judgments.[28] Finally, and in contrast to their study, we used a large sample of the Jewish population in Israel, which is more representative than a group of students.[29] Thus, our study's design offers both external and internal validity for our results, with a much greater ability to account for the characteristics of potential decision makers.

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20. *See* discussion *infra* Section III.B.
21. *See* discussion *infra* Section III.A.
22. *See* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 352–53.
23. *See id.* at 351.
24. *See* discussion *infra* Section IV.
25. *See* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 351.
26. *Id.*
27. *See* discussion *infra* Section III.B.
28. *See generally* BECKER, *supra* note 2; *see also* Neumark, *supra* note 3, 414-45.
29. *See* discussion *infra* Section III.A.

Our study contributes to the existing literature on discrimination by offering an innovative methodology for disentangling some of the dominant mechanisms generating discrimination in general, documenting differences in the types of discrimination directed at different social groups in particular, and offering both internal and external validity for our findings. This project shows that no single legal policy can effectively address all types of discrimination, and the anti-discrimination laws of many countries do not address these differences across the variations of discrimination.[30]

The U.S. federal and state employment discrimination laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of traits such as race, gender, religion, national origin, physical disability, and age in the private sector, taking a surprisingly uniform approach.[31] In contrast to these federal and state statutes, the U.S. Constitution implicitly prohibits governmental entities from practicing employment discrimination, and it does make distinctions between different types of discrimination. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property without due process,[32] while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from violating individuals' rights to due process and guarantees equal protection under the law.[33] Certain distinctions between people, when made by the federal or state legislature, are defined as "suspect classifications," and as a consequence are subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause if challenged.[34] When classifications do not meet

30. *See Anti-Discrimination*, MIGRANT INTEGRATION POL'Y INDEX 2020, http://www.mipex.eu/anti-discrimination (last visited Oct. 26, 2022).

31. A growing body of federal employment statutes provide protection from discrimination based on group membership. *See Protections Against Discrimination and Other Prohibited Practices*, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy-notices/no-fear-act/protections-against-discrimination (last visited Oct. 13, 2022). Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits employers from paying different wages based on the sex of employees (but not other discriminatory employment practices). 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits employment discrimination based on age. 29 U.S.C. § 623. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination and expands the employment opportunities for disabled individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 791. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits discrimination on the basis of a physical or mental disability by employers. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. This federal law is in effect throughout the country, but almost every state has also adopted its own legislation precluding employment discrimination. *See* Iris Hentze & Rebecca Tyus, *Discrimination and Harassment in the Workplace*, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/employment-discrimination.aspx.

32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

34. *See* United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 & 155 n.4 (1938); *see also* Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 219-20 (1944) (upholding Executive Order 9066, which ordered all persons of Japanese descent to be held in internment camps during World War II); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (striking down Virginia's law banning interracial marriage), for examples of the strict scrutiny test application.

these criteria—i.e., when they are not "suspect"—the Supreme Court usually applies intermediate[35] or rational basis scrutiny[36] rather than strict scrutiny. The level of scrutiny applied is of critical importance. Strict scrutiny tends to be a rigorous standard of review,[37] in contrast to rational basis scrutiny, which adheres to a more lenient standard.[38]

To pass the strict scrutiny test, any such distinction must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.[39] When determining which classifications require strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has traditionally applied the following criteria: whether the trait characterizing group members is immutable; whether there is a history of purposeful discrimination against members of the group; and whether the group is politically powerless.[40] Note that these criteria do not

35. Intermediate scrutiny has been applied to distinctions based on sex and illegitimacy—"quasi-suspect" classes—which, to pass the intermediate scrutiny test, a law must be "substantially related" to the achievement of important governmental objectives. *See, e.g.*, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–204 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% alcohol beer to men under 21 and to women under 18, rejecting statistical evidence purporting to show that males ages 18-20 are a greater traffic risk than females, and finding that the gender-based difference was not "substantially related to [the] achievement of" the statutory objective); *see also* United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-46 (1996) (invalidating male-only admissions to the Virginia Military Institute for lack of an "exceedingly persuasive justification"); J.E.B. v. Alabama *ex rel.* T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135-43 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-32 (1982) (invalidating the all-female admissions policy at a nursing school), for examples of the intermediate scrutiny test application.

36. The rational basis test applies when there is no suspect or quasi-suspect classification involved, or when there is no infringement of a fundamental right—to pass the test, the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. *See, e.g.*, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-47 (1985) (striking down a city ordinance requiring a special permit for a group home for the developmentally disabled, but not requiring one for hospitals, sanitariums, or nursing homes); Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461-70 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota law banning the sale of milk in nonreturnable plastic containers, but permitting its sale in nonreturnable paperboard containers); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma statute prohibiting opticians from supplying lenses without a prescription from an optometrist or ophthalmologist); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (upholding a New York regulation allowing advertising on trucks used for deliveries, but prohibiting them on trucks used mainly for advertising).

37. *But see Korematsu*, 323 U.S. at 223-24 (upholding an order under the strict scrutiny test).

38. *But see City of Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 441-50 (striking down an ordinance that did not meet the rational basis test). Note, however, that in this case the court might have suspected animus toward the developmentally disabled. *Id.*

39. *See, e.g., Carolene Products*, 304 U.S. at 153; Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (describing that to pass strict scrutiny a distinction "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose") (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)).

40. *See* Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 686 n.17 (1973) (discussing the history of sex discrimination and whether or not women are a small and powerless minority); *see also* LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16-23 (3rd ed. 2000) (considering such factors as political powerlessness, a history of discrimination, immutable traits, and relevance of classification, to a

acknowledge the different mechanisms generating different types of discrimination. Our findings show the need to acknowledge these different mechanisms when designing anti-discrimination laws.

In Israel, the Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, which passed in 1988, prohibits employers from discriminating between employees and job candidates on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, nationality, or other devalued traits.[41] Similarly to the United States, it does not distinguish between these categories, and thus applies a uniform approach to prohibiting discrimination.[42]

II. BACKGROUND: DEVALUED SOCIAL GROUPS IN ISRAEL

A. Arabs

Arab-Israelis comprise about 21% of the population of Israel,[43] and discrimination against Arab-Israelis is considered to be a very common type of workforce discrimination.[44] On average, there is a 40% pay gap between Arab and Jewish employees nationwide.[45] This gap can only be partially explained by pre-market discrimination and differences in education and socioeconomic backgrounds.[46] Indeed, this gap is almost identical to the Black-White wage gap in the United States.[47] Notably, however, discrimination against Arabs in Israel has

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governmental purpose); Bruce A. Ackerman, *Beyond Carolene Products*, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 718 (1985) (explaining the four operative terms of Carolene Products to be "(1) prejudice, (2) discrete, (3) insular, and (4) minorities"); Jane Rutherford, *Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion*, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1081 (1996) ("The Supreme Court focuses on immutability, a history of discrimination, lack of political access, and discrete and insular status as the hallmarks of powerlessness, that trigger heightened scrutiny."); Mark Strasser, *Suspect Classes and Suspect Classification: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise*, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 938-39 (1991) (evaluating what a suspect class is); Thomas W. Simon, *Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory*, 45 MIAMI L. REV. 107, 123-28 (1990) (discussing the *Carolene Products* doctrine); James W. Ellis, *On the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications*, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 376 (1986) (discussing the criteria of history of discrimination, powerlessness, and being substantially disadvantaged in the political arena).

41. Equality of Opportunities in Labour Law, 5748-1988 , 42 LSI 31, (1987-1988) (Isr.).

42. *See generally, id.*

43. Media Release, St. of Isr. Cent. Bureau Stat., 68th Independence Day — 8.5 Million Residents in the State of Israel (May 9, 2016), https://cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template_eng.html?hodaa=201611134..

44. See Ariel, *supra* note 18, at 114 (2015).

45. Media Releasae, St. of Isr. Cent. Bureau Stat., Paid Income of Employees from the 2014 Household Expenditure Survey (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201515276 (Hebrew).

46. *Id.*

47. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 4-11 (U.S. Census Bureau ed. 2016).

unique, nonracial characteristics as well: most prominently, Arabs are stereotypically thought to present a greater workplace safety risk, presumably due to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[48]

In a 2015 survey conducted by the Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry, 39% of Arabs reported feeling discriminated against,[49] and 42% of employers reported that they would prefer not to (or are less eager to) employ Arabs.[50] In high-skilled occupations, where beliefs about skill and talent tend to be highly relevant, the disparities are more striking. Only 20% of Arab scientists and engineers, and 51% of Arab lawyers and economists manage to secure employment in their fields—a significantly lower proportion than that of their Jewish counterparts.[51] In another study, resumés that appeared to be from Jewish lawyers were found to be four times more likely to be invited to a job interview than when resumés appeared to be from Arab lawyers.[52]

B. Women

Israeli women experience a gender wage gap of about 20%, which is similar in magnitude to that in the United States.[53] The fact that women and men tend to work in different occupations contributes significantly to the gender wage gap.[54] According to a 2013 survey conducted by the Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry, only 11% of women reported having been discriminated against during the process of looking for a job.[55] Nonetheless, 23% of mothers of children under

48. Revital Bar & Asaf Zussman, *Customer Discrimination: Evidence from Israel*, 35 J. LAB. ECON., 1031, 1032 (2017).

49. Lee Yaron, *39% of Israeli Arabs Feel Discriminated Against in Job Market, Poll Shows*, HAARETZ NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2015-12-09/ty-article/.premium/study-39-of-israeli-arabs-feel-discriminated-against/0000017f-ef24-da6f-a77f-ff2e7b0f0000.

50. Dan Soen, *Descent and Exclusion: Israeli Arabs at the Bottom of the Social Pyramid*, *in* SOCIAL ISSUES IN ISRAEL, 6-31 (Ariel Univ. Ctr. ed., 2012).

51. *See id.*

52. *See* Ariel, *supra* note 18, at 135.

53. *See* Taub Center Staff, *International Women's Day 2022: Gender Wage Gaps in Israel and the Impact of Research*, TAUB CTR. (Feb. 2022), https://www.taubcenter.org.il/en/research/international-womens-day-2022-gender-wage-gaps-in-israel-and-the-impact-of-research/; *see also* Tali Heruti-Sover, *Gender Wage Gap in Israel Among Highest in the West*, HAARETZ NEWS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/2017-10-11/ty-article/gender-wage-gap-in-israel-among-highest-in-the-west/0000017f-e5c9-df2c-a1ff-ffd9c29a0000.

54. Valentin Bolotnyy & Natalia Emanuel, *How Unpredictable Schedules Widen the Gender Pay Gap*, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul. 1, 2022), https://hbr.org/2022/07/how-unpredictable-schedules-widen-the-gender-pay-gap.

55. Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry, Research and Economy Administration, *Survey: Feelings of Discrimination of Employees and Job Seekers and Employment Diversity in Workplaces*, http://www.economy.gov.il/Research/Documents/DiscriminationFeelings2013.pdf (Hebrew).

six reported experiencing discrimination in the workplace.[56] About 60% of all cases brought to the Israeli Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are related to gender discrimination.[57]

C. Mizrahi Jews

Jewish migrants to Israel from North African and Middle Eastern countries (known as Mizrahi Jews) consistently experience greater employment discrimination than Jewish migrants from Europe and North America ("Ashkenazi" Jews).[58] Population surveys document that in the early 1990s, the annual wage of Mizrahi men was 67.7% from that of Ashkenazi men.[59] In the late 1990s, the wage gap stood at approximately 12%, after controlling for education, experience, and non-ethnic demographic characteristics.[60] Current studies show that Mizrahi Jews continue to be discriminated against in both hiring and wages, especially in high-status occupations.[61] A 2014 survey found that the average wage of Mizrahi Jews was only 78.2% from that of Ashkenazi Jews.[62] By examining the salaries earned by people born to such interethnic couples, Yona Rubinstein and Dror Brenner found that people bearing a stereotypically Mizrahi surname received significantly lower wages, suggesting a causal impact of perceived ethnicity.[63]

D. Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Ultra-Orthodox Jews comprise between 10-13% of Israel's population.[64] While for many years ultra-Orthodox men did not participate in the Israeli labor force,

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56. Hila Weissberg, *Arabs, Haredim and Women Suffer Most Workplace Discrimination in Israel*, HAARETZ NEWS (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/2014-01-08/ty-article/.premium/employment-discrimination-report/0000017f-dc5b-df9c-a17f-fe5bf2d60000.

57. *Id.*

58. *See* Yona Rubinstein & Dror Brenner, *Pride and Prejudice: Using Ethnic-Sounding Names and Inter-Ethnic Marriages to Identify Labour Market Discrimination*, 81 REV. ECON. STUD. 389, 390 (2014).

59. Yinon Cohen & Yitchak Haberfeld, *Second-Generation Jewish Immigrants in Israel: Have the Ethnic Gaps in Schooling and Earnings Declined?*, 21 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 507, 515 (1998).

60. Rubinstein & Brenner, *supra* note 58, at 391.

61. *See generally* Ariel, *supra* note 18; Rubenstein & Brenner, *supra* note 58; DORIT SASSON, ARE GRINBERG AND BERNSTEIN MORE EMPLOYABLE THAN BUZALGO AND ABUKSIS? A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION BY ORIGIN AND GENDER (2006).

62. SHLOMO SWIRSKI ET AL., ADVA CTR., 2015 SOCIAL SNAPSHOT 14 (2015), http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/social-2015-1.pdf.

63. *See* Rubenstein & Brenner, *supra* note 58, at 417–18.

64. *See* Gilad Malach & Lee Cahaner, *Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel*, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Jan. 1, 2021), https://en.idi.org.il/haredi/2020/?chapter=34272; *see also*_Steve Hendrix, *Ousted from Power, Israel's Ultra-Orthodox Lose the Final Word on What's Kosher*, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2021, 3:17 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-ultra-orthodox-jews/2021/11/19/3e55963e-460e-11ec-beca-3cc7103bd814 _story.html.

their workplace involvement has been on the rise in recent years.[65] However, given this group's relatively low labor force participation rate, most Israelis report that they have never worked with ultra-Orthodox people.[66] In a 2014 survey, more than 30% of employers reported that they did not want or were not eager to work with ultra-Orthodox co-workers.[67] Moreover, 25% of the participants believed that because math and English are not taught in ultra-Orthodox schools, members of this social group did not possess the necessary qualifications for employment.[68] Indeed, a recent study showed that the average monthly wage of ultra-Orthodox Jews was 72% of the average monthly wage in the general population, although this finding could be explained in part by the fact that ultra-Orthodox Jews tend to hold part-time jobs.[69]

III. THE EXPERIMENTS

A. Sample

We designed a series of internet-based experiments intended to disentangle some of the dominant mechanisms generating discrimination in Israel. The experiments were conducted online by the Dialogue Research Institute. The participants were composed of two panels of 1,078 and 1,115 Jewish Israelis.[70] There were no Muslims or Christians on either panel. Each panel constituted a representative sample of the Israeli-Jewish adult population, which accounts for about 80% of the Israeli population, thus granting the experiment a grounded external validity with regard to the discrimination patterns that exist within Israeli-Jewish society. Table 1 below presents relevant personal and demographic characteristics of the participants.

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65. *See* Daniel Douek, *Majority of Ultra-Orthodox Men Now Working*, TIMES ISR. (Feb. 3, 2016); *see also* Lauren Frayer, *As Israel's Ultra-Orthodox Enter The Workforce, High-Tech Beckons*, NPR (Nov. 12, 2016, 8:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/11/12/501620376/as-israels-ultra-orthodox-enter-the-workforce-high-tech-beckons.

66. Israel Ministry of Economy and Industry, *Survey: Feelings of Discrimination of Employees and Job Seekers and Employment Diversity in Workplaces*, http://economy.gov.il/Publications/PressReleases/Pages/2014/March/Ethnic-Discrimination.aspx.

67. *Id.*; *see also* Ido Solomon, *Survey: Employers Don't Want Arabs, Haredim, Disabled*, HAARETZ NEWS (Jan. 5, 2011), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/2011-01-05/ty-article/survey-employers-dont-want-arabs-haredim-disabled/0000017f-e8bc-df2c-a1ff-fefd97d20000.

68. Gilad Malach et al., *A Master Plan for Ultra-Orthodox Employment in Israel*, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. 67 (2016), https://en.idi.org.il/media/4670/taasukat_karedim_web.pdf.

69. *Id.*.

70. The reasons for using two separate panels of participants will be discussed in the following section.

TABLE 1–PERSONAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS

	Panel A	Panel B
Gender (percentage)		
Female	52	53
Male	48	47
Ethnicity (percentage)		
Mizrahi Jews[71]	22	30
Ashkenazi Jews[72]	33	36
Mixed / Other	45	34
Religiosity (percentage)		
Secular	30	31
Traditional	26	25
Religious	29	29
Ultra-Orthodox	15	15
Average age (years)	40	40
Graduates[73] (percentage)	31	31
Observations	1,078	1,115

Notes: Rounded to the nearest integer

B. Methodology

Altogether, the project involved four games, where the first three were played with randomly chosen computerized partners presented as other participants playing remotely. In fact, the "partners" in all three games were computer algorithms, programmed to react in a consistent manner independent of the

71. *See* Rachel M. Solomin, *Who Are Mizrahi Jews?*, MY JEWISH LEARNING, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-mizrahi-jews/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2022) (detailing that both parents are Jewish immigrants, or the descendants of Jewish immigrants, from Arab countries).

72. *See* Rachel M. Solomin, *Who Are Ashkenazi Jews?*, MY JEWISH LEARNING, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/who-are-ashkenazi-jews/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2022) (detailing that both parents are Jewish immigrants, or the descendants of Jewish immigrants, from European countries).

73. Earned at least one academic degree.

participant's choice of action.[74] The computerized partners bore one of five different first and last names, as well as a city of residence. The names chosen were culturally associated with one of the following five social groups: secular Jewish Ashkenazi men (serving as a baseline category), and the four devalued social groups studied, each defined by a single deviation from the baseline group, on a dimension of either gender (women), ethnicity (Mizrahi Jews), race (Arabs), or religion (Ultra-Orthodox Jews).

Following the conclusion of the first three games, which will be described in the following subsections, the participants played an additional game where they were given the option to donate some of the money that they had earned in the first three games to a social cause, to be selected from five possibilities. Four of these were presented as having the mission of increasing the labor force participation of members of one of the four devalued groups in this study; the aim of the fifth cause was, to increase entrepreneurship in the market, unrelated to sociodemographic considerations. Thereafter, participants were asked to evaluate their game partners on several dimensions, and to report their perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination in society. At the end, each participant was paid the net amount of money that he or she had accumulated throughout the various stages of the experiment (minus the donation, if one was made).

As mentioned above, the experiment involved two different samples with similar characteristics.[75] Panel A was comprised of 1,078 participants, who first played the dictator game and then the trust game.[76] Each game was played with a different partner. As will be discussed below, the partner in the dictator game is completely passive. Therefore we did not randomize the order of these two games. A different panel of 1,115 participants (of similar characteristics) played the third game—the competence game. In this way, our design eliminated the concern that the interactions in the second game (the trust game) could affect the behavior of participants in the third game (the competence game). The fourth game—the donations game—was the last game, and was played by all the participants from the two panels. Because in this game we asked participants whether they would like to donate some of the money they had earned in previous games, this game had to be played last. Given this design, it is reasonable to expect that the behavior of participants in the donation game was affected by the experience of playing with their different partners in the previous stages of the experiment. We explore this

74. Participants were informed of the purpose of the study at the end of the experiment.

75. *See supra* Table 1.

76. *Id.*

possibility below, finding several intriguing results regarding the effects of one's immediate interactions on the tendency to donate.

C. Taste Discrimination: The Dictator Game

The first game the participants played was the dictator game. In this one-stage game, each research participant received 10 ILS[77] and was asked to allocate the money between themself and their randomly chosen partner—a fictitious person bearing one of the types of first and last names and residence stereotypically associated with one of the social groups studied, as discussed earlier. Here, gains did not depend on the partner's behavior; in fact, the partner played no role in the game. At the beginning of the game, the instructions informed participants that their partners were passive—i.e., they could not affect the outcome in any way, and the players' decision whether to give away some of the money to their partner on altruistic grounds would conclude that game. Therefore, stereotypes about trust and competence were irrelevant.

Dictator games were first used to investigate fairness.[78] Later Fershtman and Gneezy used this method to explore ethnic discrimination.[79] Based on the context of the current study, we designed this game to investigate a certain set of attitudes and emotions that people have towards different groups in society, which conjointly constitute the basis for the altruistic or egoistic behavior that contributes to taste discrimination.[80] Among the attitudes that might drive participants to giving more or less money to a stranger—when all they know is the group identity—are feelings of dislike towards that group, disgust, pity, admiration, distrust, a sense of fairness, indebtedness, etc.[81] Therefore, differences in the money allocated to partners with different names in the dictator game would provide evidence for the exercise of taste discrimination.[82]

Table 2 shows the amount of money (out of 10 ILS) that the participants chose to transfer to their fictitious partners, according to the group membership of the partner. The overall average amount transferred was 3.3 ILS, which is roughly consistent with the high-end averages of previous studies conducted in a similar

77. New Israeli Sheqel (Israeli currency)—10 ILS equaled approximately 2.60 USD at the time of the experiment.

78. *See generally* Gary E. Bolton et al., *Dictator Game Giving: Rules of Fairness Versus Acts of Kindness*, 27 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 269 (1998).

79. *See* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 351.

80. *See generally* BECKER, *supra* note 2 and accompanying text.

81. *See generally* Bolton, *supra* note 79.

82. *See* Ferstham & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 351-52.

fashion.[83] However, there are no statistically significant differences between the average amounts transferred to the different partners.

TABLE 2–MONEY GIVEN TO PARTNERS IN THE DICTATOR GAME

	Money Given (average)	Observations
	3.24	
	(1.94)	
Partners' Group Membership		
Baseline: Ashkenazi Men	3.52	202
	(1.85)	
Gender: Women	3.45	226
	(2.01)	
Ethnicity: Mizrahi Men	3.17	213
	(2.01)	
Religion: Ultra-Orthodox Jews	3.10	196
	(2.14)	
Race: Arabs	3.30	206
	(1.99)	
All		1,043

Notes: Amounts in ILS; standard errors in parentheses

To further explore the patterns of participants' decision-making, in Table 3, we present the results of the OLS regression models predicting the amount given to partners in the dictator game.[84] In both models, the arbitrarily omitted category is a female partner. Model 2 includes the demographic characteristics of the participants in the experiment: age, education, socioeconomic sector, marital status, sex, ethnicity, and nationality.[85]

83. *See generally* Robert Forsythe et al., *Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments*, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347 (1994); John A. List, *On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games*, J. POL. ECON. 115 (2007).

84. *See supra* Table 3.

85. *Id.* These are not necessary from a statistical standpoint, in an experimental setting. Indeed, as expected, adding them did not significantly affect the studies' treatment effect. However, controlling for these features will prove useful in exploring various additional patterns in the behavior of the participants.

In both models, Arab partners received less money than female partners (about 0.42 ILS less in Model 1 and about 0.43 less in Model 2, $p < 0.05$).[86] Likewise, ultra-Orthodox male partners received about 0.35 ILS less than women in Model 1 (although this difference is only marginally significant), and about 0.41 ILS less in Model 2 when controlling for the participants' characteristics.[87] Next, to explore possible heterogeneity in the treatment effect on the behavior of male and female participants, we analyzed each group of participants separately, as presented in Figure 1 below.

86. *Id.*
87. *Id.*

TABLE 3–OLS REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING THE AMOUNT GIVEN TO PARTNERS IN THE DICTATOR GAME

	Model 1	Model 2
Ashkenazi Partner	-0.29	-0.26
	(0.19)	(0.20)
Mizrahi Partner	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.19)	(0.20)
Orthodox Partner	-0.35^{+}	-0.41*
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Arab Partner	-0.42*	-0.43*
	(0.19)	(0.20)
Participants' Characteristics:		
Female		0.20
		(0.13)
Age		0.01
		(0.01)
Ashkenazi		0.00
		(0.20)
Mizrahi		0.11
		(0.20)
Mixed Ethnicity		0.03
		(0.20)
Other Demographic Controls Included	No	Yes
Constant	3.52**	3.55**
	(0.13)	(0.37)
Observations	1,027	1,000
R^2	0.007	0.026

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; omitted category of partners is female partners; $^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$

FIGURE 1–TRANSFERS TO PARTNERS IN THE DICTATOR GAME (BY GENDER; IN ILS)



Figure 1 shows the amount given to partners, by the gender of the participants. Women playing the dictator game transferred on average 3.38 ILS of their 10 ILS; the differences in the amounts given to the recipients associated with the different social groups were insignificant. In contrast, men transferred the lower amount of 3.22 ILS on average to their partners, with the amounts varying considerably (and statistically significantly) across the different social groups in a non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA test (Chi2(4) = 12.56, p = 0.014). Thus, for example, men on average gave women 21.6% more than they gave Arabs, and 32.4% more than they gave ultra-Orthodox Jews. Strikingly, women participants did not give women more than they gave men—neither men in general nor Ashkenazi men in particular—whereas male participants gave women more than they gave to any other marginalized group.[88]

88. *See supra* Figure 1; *see also* discussion *supra* p. 13 and Tables 2 & 3. We further explored the behavior of participants when interacting with in-group partners versus out-group partners. On average, non ultra-Orthodox Jews gave to ultra-Orthodox Jews an amount 7.2% lower than that given to the other groups, though this result was only marginally statistically significant (p = 0.07). However, when Arab partners were excluded from the analysis, we found that Jews who are not ultra-Orthodox gave ultra-Orthodox Jews 8.9% less than the other Jewish groups received; this finding was

D. Statistical/Stereotypical Discrimination: The Trust Game

The second game participants played was a trust game designed to investigate the existence and magnitude of mistrust toward different social groups in Israeli society. This two-stage game was initially used to study trust in general, and later to explore ethnic discrimination.[89] In the first stage of the game, each research participant received 10 ILS and was asked to decide whether to allocate some of it to their partner, whom they assumed belonged to one of the five social groups of interest. Participants knew that the sum selected would then be tripled by the experimenter and transferred to the partner. In the second stage, the partner was asked to decide whether he wanted to transfer some of the tripled amount back to the participant and if so, how much. At that point, the algorithm was executed in such a way that the partner always gave back half of the tripled amount.

Because gains for the research participant in this game are achieved through cooperation, the amount they decide to transfer to their partner would serve as an indicator of their trust in the partner. More specifically, the participant may be reluctant to transfer money to their partner if they worried that the partner will not transfer back any of the money in the second stage. Thus, differences in the amounts transferred to partners with different names would provide evidence for discriminatory behavior based on feelings and stereotypes of mistrust, which account for a significant proportion of the statistical/stereotypical discrimination in the labor market.

Table 4 presents the amount of money (out of 10 ILS) that participants chose to transfer to their partners, by the group membership of the partner. Overall, the average amount of money transferred was 3.86 ILS. As in the dictator game, this figure is roughly consistent with the results of earlier studies conducted under similar conditions.[90] However, the results demonstrate several different patterns of discrimination from those found in the dictator game.

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statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). On the other hand, as expected, we did not find that ultra-Orthodox Jews themselves treated ultra-Orthodox partners differently. Interestingly, non-Mizrahi Jews gave Mizrahi Jews 10.8% *more* on average than any other social group ($p < 0.05$), whereas Mizrahi Jews gave members of their own group 13.3% *less* compared to all the other social groups; however, this difference was only marginally significant ($p = 0.08$). Finally, we found no difference between the sums that Ashkenazi Jewish participants gave Ashkenazi partners and what they gave to all the other groups. All significance levels reported here are based on t-tests.

89. *See* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5.

90. *See* Joyce Berg et al., *Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History*, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 122, 130-31 (1995).

TABLE 4–MONEY GIVEN TO PARTNERS IN THE TRUST GAME

	Money Given (average)	Observations
	3.92	
	(2.62)	
Partners' Group Membership		
Baseline: Ashkenazi Men	4.00	199
	(2.73)	
Gender: Women	3.69	229
	(2.48)	
Ethnicity: Mizrahi Men	4.25	213
	(2.61)	
Religion: Ultra-Orthodox Jews	3.53	170
	(2.54)	
Race: Arabs	3.86	214
	(2.60)	
All		1,025

Notes: Amounts in ILS; standard errors in parentheses

First and foremost, we find that the amounts transferred to partners in the trust game vary significantly across the different social groups in a non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA test (Chi2(4) = 10.71, $p = 0.03$). Most notably, Arabs received the lowest amount on average, similar to the results in the dictator game, while ultra-Orthodoxs received the highest amount on average, despite having been given the lowest amounts (on average) in the dictator game by male participants. This result is possibly driven by inferences made from the religiousity of ultra-Orthodox about their trustworthiness. More importantly, these differences in how members of the racial and religious minority groups were treated across different games, which elicit different types of attitudes, exemplifies our argument that anti-discrimination laws and policies should be tailored to the specific beliefs that people hold about other members of society in the relevant context, and that these beliefs should be rigorously measured to inform policymaking.

To further investigate participants' responses, when comparing the amounts transferred to ultra-Orthodox Jews to the amount transferred to all other partners combined using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests, we can see that ultra-Orthodox men received a higher amount by 12.33% on average compared to all the other groups ($p = 0.012$). Even more so, ultra-Orthodox Jews received from

non-ultra-Orthodox Jews an amount 16.05% higher, on average, than the other groups ($p = 0.004$). No statistically significant difference was found in the amount that ultra-Orthodox Jews gave their group members compared to all other partners.[91] It follows that ultra-Orthodox Jews are perceived to be trustworthy by members of the other groups, but not necessarily by themselves. We found no other significant in-group or out-group effects in this game with regard to Mizrahi or Ashkenazi Jews participants and partners.

FIGURE 2–TRANSFERS TO PARTNERS IN THE TRUST GAME (BY GENDER; IN ILS)



Figure 2 illustrates the differences between the amounts transferred by men and women participants across the social groups of partners. On average, women participants trusted their partners less compared to men participants, allocating to their partners 0.59 ILS less on average than men did ($p = 0.007$). This finding implies that women, on average, are either less trusting or more risk-averse than

91. All results are similar in significance levels to those obtained using a parametric t-test, but a t-test assumes that the responses of participants are normally distributed, which is not the case in our study (nor in any study using these types of games), such that it is unwarranted to use it or any other type of parametric test.

men.[92] Whereas the difference between the amounts transferred by men to the various partners was insignificant, the amounts transferred by women varied significantly (K-W ANOVA test, Chi2(4) = 13.74, $p = 0.008$). Interestingly, most of the variance seemed to be due to the small amount women gave to Arabs, 2.88 ILS on average—a substantially lower sum (23.07% less) than the average amount they gave to the other social groups jointly (M-W U test, $p = 0.001$). Male participants, in contrast, gave the smallest amount on average to Mizrahi Jew partners; 13.3% less than they gave on average to the rest of the groups of partners combined (M-W U test, $p = 0.06$).[93]

E. Statistical/Stereotypical Discrimination: The Competence Game

The third game was a competence game, designed to investigate the effect of the perceived competence of different social groups. In this game, research participants were instructed to answer ten SAT-style logic questions jointly with their partners. To this end, each participant was asked to determine how many of the ten questions would be presented to them to solve, with the rest given to their partner to solve separately. They were further instructed that they and their partners would be paid, on the basis of their joint performance, two ILS for each correct answer that either of them solved. This payment would then be divided equally between the participant and the partner. Take, for example, a participant who decided to try and solve six of the ten questions on their own, leaving four questions to be solved by their partner. Further, assume that the participant solved five of their six questions correctly, and that the partner solved two of their four questions correctly. In this scenario, the payoff to the participants would be fourteen ILS, representing the aggregate payment for the seven questions that they solved correctly. Participants were also told that there was a time limit of ten minutes to answer the ten questions, regardless of the allocation of questions determined by the participant. Here, again, partners varied by their names representing the various social groups.

Because of the limited time in which they had to complete the assignment, an incentive existed for the research participants to divide the questions equally and for the partners to answer five questions each—unless they believed that one of them was more competent than the other, in which case it would be beneficial to allocate more questions to the more competent of the pair. Thus, differences in the allocation of questions across partners with different names would provide evidence of discriminatory behavior generated by stereotypes about competence. Finally,

92. *See* Lex Borghans et al., *Gender Differences in Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion*, 7 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 649, 650 (2009); *see also* Renate Schubert et al., *Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk Averse?*, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 384 (1999).

93. *Compare with* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 372–73 (finding that Mizrahi men are more likely to be discriminated against by men than by women). However, we did not find a difference between the amounts that men and women participants gave to Mizrahi men. Moreover, in our data it seems to be women, not men, who are driving the overall differences between the recipient groups.

after completion of the game, participants were informed how many of the questions were solved correctly by their partners—who had been programmed to "answer" correctly half of the questions allocated to them (rounded down).

Table 6 presents the number of questions (out of ten) that participants chose to allocate to their partners, by the group membership of the partner. The average number of questions assigned to a fictitious partner was 4.02—15% of participants assigned their partners no questions at all; 19% assigned one to four questions; 58.6% assigned exactly five questions; only 7.4% gave their partners more than half of the questions. Thus, leaving out the participants who chose an equal allocation of questions, there was a ratio of 1:4.5 between participants who perceived their partner as being more capable than themselves and participants who saw themselves as more capable than their partners—implying that participants may have been confident or optimistic in predicting their own relative success. Perhaps surprisingly, we did not find a significant difference between men and women in the number of questions they allocated to their partners, implying that women do not evaluate their own competence differently to men. This finding is consistent with several previous studies.[94] In terms of the number of questions allocated to partners associated with the different social groups, we find no statistically significant differences.

94. *See, e.g.*, Wendy Johnson & Norma McCoy, *Self-Confidence, Self-Esteem, and Assumption of Sex Role in Young Men and Women*, 90 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 751, 751–56 (2000); Leonard H. Chusmir & Christine S. Koberg, *Relationship Between Self-Confidence and Sex Role Identity Among Managerial Women and Men*, 131 J. SOC. PSYCH. 781, 781-90 (1991).

TABLE 6–MONEY GIVEN TO PARTNERS IN THE COMPETENCE GAME

	Money Given (average)	Observations
Partners' Group Membership		
Baseline: Ashkenazi Men	3.99 (2.04)	212
Gender: Women	4.12 (1.97)	212
Ethnicity: Mizrahi Men	4.09 (1.96)	223
Religion: Ultra-Orthodox Jews	4.08 (2.08)	214
Race: Arabs	3.83 (2.02)	206
All	4.02 (2.01)	1,067

Notes: Amounts in ILS; standard errors in parentheses

To further explore the patterns of participants' decision-making, table 7 presents the results of the OLS regression models predicting the number of questions allocated by participants to their partners, by the demographic characteristics of partners and participants. Again, in both models the (arbitrarily) omitted category is a female partner.

Arab partners received fewer questions than female partners, but the results are only marginally significant—Model 2, about 0.32 fewer questions ($p < 0.1$).[95] When compared to all other partners combined, Arabs received 5.8% fewer questions on average (M-W U test, $p = 0.054$). As to partners of Mizrahi ethnicity, in the trust game we found that men perceived Mizrahi men as relatively less trustworthy than the women participants did, which is consistent with the findings of Fershtman and Gneezy.[96] Interestingly, here we found some evidence that women allocated to Mizrahi male partners 12.9% more questions than did the men participants (M-W U test, $p = 0.07$). This suggests that men perceive Mizrahi men not only as less trustworthy but also as less competent than women perceive them to be.

95. *See infra* Table 7.

96. *See* Fershtman & Gneezy, *supra* note 5, at 363.

TABLE 7–OLS REGRESSION MODELS PREDICTING THE AMOUNT GIVEN TO PARTNERS IN THE COMPETENCE GAME

	Model 1	Model 2
Ashkenazi Partner	-0.13	-0.14
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Mizrahi Partner	-0.03	-0.05
	(0.19)	(0.20)
Orthodox Partner	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Arab Partner	-0.29	-0.32^{+}
	(0.20)	(0.20)
		0.17
Participants' Characteristics:		(0.13)
Female		0.01
Age		(0.01)
Ashkenazi		0.40*
Mizrahi		(0.20)
Mixed Ethnicity		0.44*
		(0.20)
		0.40^{+}
		(0.24)
Other Demographic Controls Included	No	Yes
Constant	4.12**	3.65**
	(0.14)	(0.31)
Observations	1,058	1,058
R^2	0.003	0.024

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; omitted category of partners is female partners; $^{+}p < 0.10$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$

We found no significant differences between the manner in which participants treated partners who belonged to their own social groups, in-group effects, and partners who did not belong to their own social groups, out-group effects.

F. Normative Discrimination (Donation Stage) and Debiasing Through Social Interactions

In the final stage of the experiment, participants were asked whether they wanted to donate any of the money that they had earned to one of five nonprofit organizations. The first four organizations were described as aiming to promote employment in the following four groups that suffer from discrimination in the labor market: women, Mizrahi Jews, Arabs, and ultra-Orthodox Jews. The purpose of the fifth organization was promotion of business entrepreneurship in general. Participants' decisions on whether to donate and to whom allowed us to assess both their stated preferences among the social categories we have compared, and their willingness to pay for these stated preferences.

Roughly two-thirds (66.5%) of the participants kept the entire sum of money that they had earned for themselves. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the chosen donation targets among the remaining 33.5% of participants, who all decided to donate some portion of the money they received. As can be seen from the pie chart, the two nonprofit organizations working toward the employment of women and ultra-Orthodox Jews received the highest number of donations, with 33.9% of donating participants choosing to donate to the nonprofit organization encouraging the labor force participation of women, and 25.6% to the one helping ultra-Orthodox Jews.[97] In contrast, only 9% of the donating participants chose to donate to the organizations promoting employment opportunities for either Mizrahi Jews or Arabs.[98]

97. *See infra* Figure 3.

98. *Id.*

FIGURE 3–CAUSES SELECTED FOR DONATION (AMONG PARTICIPANTS WHO DONATED)



On average, women were less inclined to donate any of their earnings; 30.5% of women, compared to 36.6% of men, donated some funds, which is statistically significant using a two-sided Fisher's exact test ($p = 0.045$). On the other hand, using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests, we found that among those donating, women donated on average 34% more compared to men ($p < 0.001$).[99] Among all participants, women were 2.5 times more likely than men to donate some of the money that they had earned to promote women's employment ($p < 0.001$), while men were 2.1 times more likely than women to donate some of the money that they had earned to promote entrepreneurship ($p = 0.0001$). Similarly, ultra-Orthodox Jews were six times more likely than the other groups to donate some of the money they had earned to promote the employment opportunities of ultra-Orthodox Jews ($p < 0.001$). We found no significant difference between Mizrahi and non-Mizrahi Jewish participants with regard to the likelihood of donating money to promote employment opportunities for Mizrahi Jews. These results suggest a robust in-group bias when it comes to forfeiting personal gain in order to promote the interests of one's own social group.

99. Notably, this result is sensitive neither to possible differences in the amounts men and women gained from the experiment nor to the possibility that the donation causes are more appealing to women than to men (given the existence of a distinct cause that promotes women, but no distinct cause that promotes men).

Note that we characterize the decision to donate as a proxy for "normative discrimination," regardless of the motives of the donor. We do not know what motivated the participants in our study to donate; different motives may have influenced participants' donation decisions. They might have donated to a particular group because they thought that a group is discriminated against wrongfully, or because they pitied its members, or due to other related ideological motivations. Similarly, they may have refrained from donating to a specific group because they resent its members, or because they do not believe that this group requires assistance. While these different motives and feelings may not entirely overlap with those that generate normative discrimination in the labor market, we do believe this is a reasonable proxy given the inherent limitations of laboratory settings. Therefore, we do not argue that this experiment perfectly identifies normative discrimination as it is likely to manifest in the labor market. Instead, our goal was to examine how the feelings that contribute to normative discrimination vary across the different social groups.

Next, we explored the potential effect of social interaction on debiasing, as captured in our setting by whether being matched in a previous game to a partner from a specific social group affected the likelihood of donating to that group. The unique structure of our multistage experiment, where participants played with different partners in different games before facing the choice of whether to donate, allows us to explore whether and how personal interaction with individuals from a different social group may affect and change (for better or worse) the perceptions of participants about that group, and their altruistic tendencies toward that group.

We found some evidence that participants who had an ultra-Orthodox Jew as a partner in the trust game were on average 1.5 times more likely to donate some of their money to the cause of promoting the employment of ultra-Orthodox Jews, compared to those who played the game with other partners (M-W U test, $p = 0.094$). There was no evidence for a similar effect among those who played the dictator game nor for those who played the competence game with an ultra-Orthodox Jewish partner—implying that the partner's perceived fair response in the trust game (the algorithm was to give back half of the tripled amount) had a positive impact on the normative evaluation of members of that group.

Similarly, participants who played the trust game with a female partner were 1.6 times more likely to donate to the cause of promoting women's employment (M-W U test, $p = 0.009$), while playing the dictator game against a woman had an opposite effect; participants who played with a female partner were 2.1 times *less* likely to donate to the cause of promoting women's employment (M-W U test, $p = 0.008$). This negative effect may be explained by the phenomenon of "moral licensing"—the generosity toward women partners in the dictator game gave participants license not to donate to the cause of promoting women's

employment at a later stage of the experiment.[100] Playing with a female partner in the competence game had no significant effect.

Most strikingly, in contrast to interacting with women and ultra-Orthodox Jews, playing with an Arab partner in the trust game had a *negative* effect on the likelihood of donating some of the money to the promotion of Arabs' employment opportunities (M-W U test, $p = 0.08$). Recall that all of the partners in the trust game behaved identically, giving back half of the tripled amount. Therefore, even if we remain agnostic as to what is reasonable to infer from this behavior (giving back half the amount), rational, unbiased participants had no reason to infer anything about Arabs as a group from playing with an Arab player that differed from what they inferred about women and ultra-Orthodox Jews. Playing with an Arab partner in the competence game had an opposite, positive effect (M-W U test, $p = 0.009$), and playing with an Arab partner in the dictator game had no significant effect. Finally, playing against a Mizrahi partner had no significant effect in any of the games. While in some cases participants' donation decisions seemed to be affected by the identity of their partners, the inconsistency of such an effect's existence and direction across all social categories and all games makes it difficult to formulate the nature of this influence. Indeed, our results show that interactions with members of a disfavored social group may have an impact on the exposed agent's biased opinions regarding that group. This effect should be further studied.

G. Stereotypes and perceptions of game partners

After completing the games and deciding whether and how much of their earnings to donate, participants were asked to evaluate their partners along several personality trait dimensions. In an instrument built on the Stereotype Content Model, participants were asked to evaluate the degree to which each partner they played with was warm, nice, sincere, capable, confident, and talented.[101] Additionally, participants were asked to rate their overall satisfaction with each of their game partners. Because partners in the dictator game were completely passive, it was assumed that participants' evaluations of them would be based entirely on stereotypes attributed to each of the four social groups.

Figure 4 illustrates the average evaluation of the partners from the five social groups in the dictator game across the six dimensions of personality traits.[102] The differences across the social groups in the evaluation of each of the traits were significant in a series of five non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA

100. However, we found no significant difference in the likelihood of donating to a women's cause across participants who gave different *amounts* of money in the dictator game (*i.e.*, no evidence exists that giving more to women in the dictator game increases the moral licensing effect to refrain from donating to a women's cause).

101. *See generally* Susan T. Fiske et al., *A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition*, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 878 (2002).

102. *See infra* Figure 4.

tests ($p < 0.05$ in all tests). Participants perceived women and Ashkenazi Jewish men as the warmest, nicest, most talented, and the like, whereas they ranked Arabs lowest on all of these traits. Interestingly, men perceived women partners as warmer by 11.6% than their partners in the other groups (M-W U test, $p = 0.006$), whereas no significant evidence emerged that women perceived women as warmer than anyone else. Finally, there were significant differences in the overall satisfaction with each partner across the social groups (Chi2(4) = 9.04, $p = 0.06$), and in a similar order—with women receiving the highest satisfaction ratings as partners, and Arab partners the lowest.

FIGURE 4–EVALUATION OF PARTNERS' TRAITS IN THE DICTATOR GAME



In Figure 5, we show the traits ascribed to members of the five social groups on a two-dimensional axis, distinguishing between the traits associated with warmth and those associated with competence. The dimensions were constructed using factor analysis in accord with the literature on stereotypes.[103] The warmth dimension included the traits "warm," "nice," and "sincere." The competence dimension included the traits "capable," "confident," and "talented." As is evident from this data, Arabs were viewed as the least warm and competent whereas

103. *See* Fiske et al., *supra* note 121, at 879.

Ashkenazi men and women were viewed as the warmest and most competent, with Ashkenazi men viewed as slightly more competent and Ashkenazi women as slightly warmer.

FIGURE 5–RELATIVE EVALUATION OF PARTNER TRAITS IN THE DICTATOR GAME (FACTOR ANALYSIS)



Before concluding the study, participants were asked whether and to what extent each of the four social groups in Israel suffer from discrimination, on a scale of 1–5. Surprisingly, Arabs received the lowest average score of 2.92,[104] Mizrahi Jews received a score of 2.93, and ultra-Orthodox Jews and women were perceived as the most discriminated-against groups, each given an average score of 3.21.

Our evidence showed that the level of perceived discrimination was strongly driven by the perceptions of the members of the discriminated groups themselves. Ultra-Orthodox Jews rated the discrimination against them 37.7% higher than did other Jews (M-W U test, $p < 0.001$); women rated gender discrimination 12.8% higher than men (M-W U test, $p < 0.001$); and Mizrahi Jews rated the discrimination against them 12.8% higher than non-Mizrahi Jews (M-W

104. Although this may be due to the fact that there were no Arab participants in the sample.

U test, $p < 0.001$). These results show that the perceived discrimination against the five social groups is both inaccurate and biased, emphasizing the importance of understanding the different mechanisms driving discrimination, as further discussed below.

IV. DISCUSSION

The main contribution of our study derives from its innovative experimental approach, which was used to show that different mechanisms generate different forms of discrimination against different marginalized social groups—discrimination does not occur uniformly. In the context of discrimination in Israel, this methodology enabled us to better understand what generates discrimination against each of the four devalued groups we studied. For example, whereas ultra-Orthodox men were penalized in the dictator game, suggesting that they suffer from taste discrimination, they were favored in the trust game, suggesting that they enjoy the effects of statistical/stereotypical discrimination on the basis of the cultural belief that they are trustworthy. A large, representative sample of the Jewish population in Israel was surveyed, and participants were able to earn money based on their actions. Thus, based on study design, our findings have both internal and external validity.

Arabs were the group most discriminated against by Israeli Jews in our study, indicating that racial discrimination is driven more by negative emotions and stereotypes than any other type of discrimination. This result was consistent across all forms of discrimination. In the dictator game, Arabs were given on average the smallest amount of money and even less by male participants, implying that Arabs are disliked by Israeli Jews. In the trust game, Arabs were also given the smallest amount of money and even less by female participants, implying they are also the least trusted by Israeli Jews. These results strengthen the claims of earlier psychological studies that showed that racial difference causes mistrust.[105] In the competence game, Arabs were disfavored only marginally, implying that Arabs are also perceived as the least competent. Not surprisingly, the nonprofit association that promoted Arab employment received the smallest number of donations, even though they suffer more from labor market discrimination than any other group, demonstrating that the decision to donate is not significantly driven by objective need-based considerations. Notably, different forms of social interaction yielded different results in terms of donating to this nonprofit—e.g., playing against an Arab partner in the trust game had a negative effect on the likelihood of donating, whereas interacting with women and ultra-Orthodox partners had a positive effect despite the identical behavior of all the groups. Playing against an Arab partner in the competence game had an opposite, positive effect. Arab partners were rated as the least warm and competent, and participants were least satisfied with their Arab

105. *See* Damian A. Stanley et al., *Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic Trust Decisions*, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 7710, 7710-15 (2010).

partners. Nevertheless, Israeli Jews incorrectly rated the prevelance of discrimination against Arabs in Israeli society as the least severe.

The behavior toward ultra-Orthodox Jews exhibited in our study demonstrates why it is crucial to empirically disentangle the mechanisms generating discrimination against different social groups. In the dictator game, ultra-Orthodox Jews were allocated lower amounts of money than other Jewish groups, and even less by male participants, implying a strong negative attitude toward them insofar as this relates to feelings that drive altruistic behavior. Oppositely, in the trust game, ultra-Orthodox Jews were allocated the highest amounts of money on average, implying a high level of trust in members of this group, presumably because of their religious devoutness. Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, research participants perceived ultra-Orthodox Jews and women to be the two groups most subject to discrimination.

In all games, women and Mizrahi Jews were generally less discriminated against than Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews, despite being a primary focus of most of the prior empirical literature. In the dictator game, women received on average the highest amount, although not significantly more when compared to Ashkenazi men alone. In the donations game, the nonprofit promoting women's employment was the most frequently selected cause, with the percentage being higher for women participants. Women were perceived as the warmest and most competent social group, and participants were the most satisfied with women as partners. Participants also perceived gender discrimination, alongside discrimination against ultra-Orthodox Jews, as the most severe form of discrimination. It is important to note, nonetheless, that our study did not address perceptions of commitment to the labor force, an important mechanism that generates sex discrimination.[106] Our findings should not be understood as implying that women do not experience discrimination. Instead, we claim that sex discrimination is not driven by the psychological mechanisms covered in our experimental design: dislike, distrust, or perceptions of incompetence.

Mizrahi Jews did not receive significantly different sums in the dictator game than did other groups in the Israeli population; surprisingly, however, they were given more money from non-Mizrahi Jews than from members of their own group. In the trust game, male participants gave Mizrahi Jews less money than they did to partners from the other groups. This finding implies that while there is no distinct dislike toward Mizrahi Jews within the Israeli Jewish population (compared to feelings toward Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews), men mistrust them more than members of other groups. This finding seems consistent with recent trends

106. Other studies have found that women, and especially mothers, are perceived to be less committed to the labor force than men, which consequently, employers appear less inclined to hire them and pay them the same as they pay men. *See, e.g.*, NOEL BURGESS, THE MOTHERHOOD PENALTY: HOW GENDER AND PARENTAL STATUS INFLUENCE JUDGEMENTS OF JOB-RELATED COMPETENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT 1-2 (2013); Bernard & Correll, *supra* note 10.

portraying members of different ethnic groups as deserving of less trust in the United States.[107] In the competence game, there were no significant differences regarding Mizrahi Jews. In the donation game, the promotion of employment opportunities for Mizrahi Jews was not a popular donation cause. Finally, Mizrahi Jewish partners were rated the lowest, after Arabs, on both the warmth and competence dimensions.

Our study has some limitations. Most notably, because of the high cost of conducting the study, we did not investigate discrimination against people who belong to more than one devalued social group—Mizrahi women, for example. Related questions of intersectionality should be explored in future research. Moreover, our study does not aim to capture the entire universe of emotions and stereotypes that generate discrimination in the labor market. Instead, it focuses on a subset of stereotypes that society widely perceives as the most central for generating discrimination. Future studies should expand the scope of analysis to include other vital stereotypes and perceptions that drive discrimination.

V. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR WAYS TO CURB EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Our study has both theoretical and practical implications for the understanding of discrimination in general and employment discrimination in particular, as well as for understanding variations across different forms of discrimination. Its findings suggest that anti-discrimination laws that apply a uniform approach to all racial, ethnic, gender, and religious-based discrimination may be ineffective because each form of discrimination is generated by different mechanisms.[108] Thus, the mostly uniform approach taken by anti-discrimination laws is largely misguided. Even the more nuanced approach of U.S. constitutional law should be fine-tuned to take into account differences in the mechanisms that generate discrimination.

A. Differentiated Importance of Familiarity

The findings that emerge in this study with regard to Arabs—and to a lesser extent with regard to ultra-Orthodox Jews—suggest that some of the cognitive mechanisms driving discrimination against members of these groups are strengthened by a lack of familiarity. It has been shown that the frequency of social interactions between members of different groups affect the occurrence of discrimination; meeting others may sometimes mitigate negative cultural stereotypes.[109] The result that women and Mizrahi Jews were less discriminated

107. *See generally* Stanley, *supra* note 105.

108. *See* discussion *supra* Sections III and IV.

109. *See* John F. Dovidio et al., *Intergroup Contact: The Past, Present, and the Future*, 6(1) GRP. PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELS. 5 (2003); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, *Does Intergroup*

against supports the conclusion that the level of discrimination is related to the social distance between groups in Israeli society. Whereas Israelis interact regularly with people of different genders and ethnicities, it is unfortunately less common for Jews and Arabs, as well as secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews, to meet in the workplace, school, or public places.[110] When interactions between members of different groups are less frequent, other, more institutional mechanisms—such as the law—may assume greater importance in reducing discrimination.[111]

When the state implements programs such as creating incentives to hire members of minority groups—such as Arabs and to a lesser extent ultra-Orthodox Jews—which ultimately results in more diverse workplaces, this could potentially result in a positive spillover effect in the form of discrimination debiasing. Contrary to prevailing policies in Israel and the United States—where monetary incentives to hire racial minorities usually result in all-minority workplaces—the incentive structure should be redesigned to favor hiring patterns that create heterogeneous workplaces. In other words, the study results produced above suggest that desegregating the labor market has an additional advantage, independent of the obvious constitutional and social concerns; it reduces certain identifiable stereotypes that adversely affect both equality and labor market competition.

B. Differentiated Importance of Blinding

A similar differentiated approach is warranted with regard to blinding or masking job applications. The results established in this article support the claim that masking applications in terms of racial and religious identifying information could be even more effective in eliminating bias than masking ethnic and gender information. A classic study on masking personal information, showed that female musicians who performed auditions behind a screen, thereby concealing their gender, were more likely to pass the audition and be hired than female candidates who performed in full view.[112] However, in other contexts that focused on gender

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Contact Reduce Prejudice? Recent Meta-Analytic Findings, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 93 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000).

110. PEW RSCH. CTR., ISRAEL'S RELIGIOUSLY DIVIDED SOCIETY 28 (2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society (finding that Jews and Arabs of different religious backgrounds socially isolate from one another—further, ultra-Orthodox and secular Jews stated they have few close friends outside their own community); *see also* Soen, *supra* note 50.

111. *See* Soen, *supra* note 50.

112. *See* Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, *Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians*, 90 AM. ECON. REV. n.4, 715, 737-38 (2000) (stating that masking gender in auditions of female musicians resulted in a 50 percent increase of a woman advancing from preliminary rounds and a "severalfold" increase in likelihood that a woman would be selected in the final round) (Rouse was appointed the chair of the Council of Economic Advisers for the Biden-Harris administration).

and race, the results have been inconsistent and somewhat contradictory.[113] For example, a study by Lumb and Vail found that masking ethnic identity in an attempt to increase the acceptance rate of non-European candidates to medical schools in Europe was unsuccessful.[114] In a study conducted in Sweden, Åslund and Skans found that blinded applications were effective in eliminating the effects of both race and gender discrimination on being invited for an interview; however, the final hiring decisions showed that the initial positive effect of masking persisted only with regard to gender discrimination, and not with racial discrimination.[115] In a study conducted in the Netherlands by Bøg and Kranendonk, which focused mostly on ethnicity, a small effect of masking ethnic identity was found in invitation-for-interview decisions, but completely disappeared in the final hiring decision.[116] In a European study of the academic marketplace for candidates with doctorates in economics, masking personal information was shown to have a reverse effect in that fewer female applicants received invitations for interviews than when there was no masking of gender.[117] Thus, the automatic assumption that hiding information is necessarily beneficial should be revisited. These mixed results, illustrated in the studies above, highlight the need to understand the mechanisms that are the most dominant in generating discrimination against each of the social groups.

Moreover, incentives and training programs to decrease discrimination against certain devalued social groups should also be implemented with sensitivity to the factors that generate discrimination.[118] There is increased recognition that coercion is likely to be unproductive in changing the discriminatory behaviors based on such biases.[119] Hence, there is an increasing reliance on programs that aim to reduce implicit biases—not just explicit biases—against people from other groups.[120] Scholars have suggested various ways in which the law and employment practices can be redesigned to be more effective in reducing implicit employment

113. *See* Andrew B. Lumb & Andy Vail, *Difficulties with Anonymous Shortlistings of Medical School Applications and its Effects on Candidates with non-European Names: Prospective Cohort Study*, 320 BMJ: BRIT. MED. J. 82, 83 (2000) (stating that their study did not show statistically significant differences between blind and open applicants).

114. *See id.* at 84-85.

115. Olof Åslund & Oskar Nordström Skans, *Do Anonymous Job Application Procedures Level the Playing Field?*, INDUS. & LAB. REL. R. 82, 100-01 (2012).

116. Martin Bøg & Erik Kranendonk, *Labor Market Discrimination of Minorities? Yes, but not in Job Offers*, 37-38 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 33332, 2011).

117. Annabelle Krause et al., *Anonymous Job Applications of Fresh Ph.D. Economists*, 117 ECON. LETTERS 440, 443 (2012).

118. *See* Nina Denson, *Do Curricular and Cocurricular Diversity Activities Influence Racial Bias? A Meta-Analysis*, 79 R. EDUC. RSCH. 805 (2009) (discussing the efficacy of training programs).

119. *See generally* Ariana R. Levinson, *What the Awards Tell Us About Labor Arbitration of Employment-Discrimination Claims*, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 789 (2012).

120. *See* Patricia G. Devine et al., *Long Term Reduction in Implicit Racial Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention*, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYHC. 1267, 1270 (2012).

discrimination.[121] For example, a diversified hiring team, made up of individuals likely to be more sensitive to candidates from different minority groups, should help reduce the impact of both explicit and implicit discrimination.[122] In the Israeli context, incentives and training programs designed to encourage employers to employ ultra-Orthodox Jews should focus on reducing dislike and not on debiasing employers. Jewish Israelis do not seem to view the skills of ultra-Orthodox men negatively and actually seem to hold positive views regarding their trustworthiness.

121. *See generally* BOHNET, *supra* note 19; *see also* YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES' ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 213 (2018).

122. *See generally* Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, *Debiasing Through Law*, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).