

# A REVEALED-PREFERENCES RANKING OF LAW SCHOOLS

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## ABSTRACT

*The U.S. News & World Report (U.S. News) “Best Law Schools Rankings” defines the market for legal education. Law schools compete to improve their standing in the U.S. News rankings and fear any decline. But the U.S. News rankings are controversial, at least in part because they rely on factors that are poor proxies for quality, like peer reputation and expenditures per student. While many alternative law school rankings exist, none have challenged the market dominance of the U.S. News rankings. Presumably the U.S. News rankings benefit from a first-mover advantage, other rankings fail to provide a clearly superior alternative, or some combination of the two.*

*In theory, the purpose of ranking law schools is to provide useful information to prospective law students. Rankings can provide different kinds of information for different purposes. Existing law school rankings seek to provide information that will help prospective law students decide where to matriculate. However, objective rankings can provide useful information only if they measure factors that are salient to prospective law students, and different factors are salient to different students.*

*This Article provides the first subjective ranking of law schools. It describes a method of ranking law schools based on the revealed preferences of matriculating students. Law school admission depends almost entirely on an applicant’s Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score and undergraduate grade point average (GPA), and law schools compete to matriculate students with the highest possible combined scores. Our method of ranking law schools assumes that the “best” law schools are the most successful at matriculating the most desirable students. Accordingly, this Article provides a “best law schools ranking” based exclusively on the LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs of matriculating students. In contrast to objective rankings of law schools, which attempt to tell prospective law students which law school they should attend, this Article provides a subjective ranking of law schools by asking which law schools prospective law students actually choose to attend. This “revealed-preferences” method of ranking law schools may help identify which factors are actually salient to prospective law students.*

## INTRODUCTION

In 1987, *U.S. News* created its “Best Law Schools Rankings” and transformed the market for legal education.<sup>1</sup> Law schools almost immediately began competing to improve their position in the *U.S. News* rankings, which soon became the de facto measure of institutional success.<sup>2</sup> In fact, changes to standing in the *U.S. News* rankings can carry reward or punishment for law schools and their leaders. If a law school rises in the *U.S. News* rankings, the dean gets a raise; if it falls, the dean gets fired.<sup>3</sup>

As demand for legal education steadily grew throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, law schools increasingly competed with each other by trying to influence the factors considered by the *U.S. News* rankings, especially their “peer assessment score” and “expenditures per student.”<sup>4</sup> But the late 2000s saw a dramatic decline in law school applications and enrollment.<sup>5</sup> Today, even elite law schools receive far fewer applicants than in their

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1. See Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, *Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure Scholarly Performance*, 81 IND. L.J. 83, 84–85 (2006); Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, *What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics*, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1510 (2004).

2. See Ronald G. Ehrenberg, *Reaching for the Brass Ring: The U.S. News & World Report Rankings and Competition*, 26 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 145, 146–47 (2002).

3. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, *Some Students Want Their Deans Fired after Poor Showing in the U.S. News Rankings (And One Head That’s Already Rolled)*, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 14, 2013, 11:20 AM), <http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/some-students-want-their-deans-fired-after-poor-showing-in-the-u-s-news-rankings-and-one-head-thats-already-rolled/> (“Every year, deans and assistant deans find themselves ‘pushed out’ of a job thanks to the U.S. News rankings. Law schools and university presidents rarely say outright that changes are being made in response to the magazine . . .”).

4. For example, many law schools try to increase their peer assessment score by sending promotional materials or “law porn” to members of the legal academy. See Brian Leiter, *The Law School Observer*, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 310, 310–11 (2001). And many law schools increase their expenditures per student by increasing nominal tuition and then offering “scholarships,” which are characterized as expenditures. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON O. SCHAPIRO, *THE STUDENT AID GAME: MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION* 35 (1998); William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, *The Law School Bubble: Federal Loans Inflate College Budgets, But How Long Will That Last If Law Grads Can’t Pay Their Bills?*, 98 A.B.A. J. 30, 34 (2012); Jerome M. Organ, *Reflections on the Decreasing Affordability of Legal Education*, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33–56 (2013); John A. Sebert, *The Cost and Financing of Legal Education*, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 516–27 (2002); Marilyn Yarbrough, *Financing Legal Education*, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457, 457–58 (2001). Law schools can also influence many of the other factors considered by the *U.S. News* rankings, but a school’s peer assessment score and expenditures per student are the factors most susceptible to manipulation. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, *Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education*, 89 IND. L.J. 941, 1006 (2014); Robert L. Jones, *A Longitudinal Analysis of the U.S. News Law School Academic Reputation Scores Between 1998 and 2013*, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 724 (2013); Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, *Methodology: 2018 Best Law School Rankings*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 13, 2017, 9:30 PM), <https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology>.

5. See Margaret Loftus, *Drop in Applications Spurs Changes at Law Schools*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 11, 2015, 9:00 AM), <http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2015/03/11/drop-in-applications-spurs-changes-at-law-schools>.

heyday, and total law school enrollment is at a fifty-year low.<sup>6</sup> A low *U.S. News* ranking is no longer just embarrassing. It can indicate and even precipitate an institution's failure. This dramatic collapse in demand for legal education has prompted a renewed conversation about the purpose of ranking law schools, the accuracy of the information conveyed by the *U.S. News* rankings, and how prospective law students use rankings.

Now, more than ever, law schools need a credible way to signal quality to prospective law students, and prospective law students need credible information about which law school to attend.<sup>7</sup> In theory, law school rankings can provide both. But only if they provide accurate information about quality and prospective law students care about the information they provide. This inevitably raises the question: What factors should a law school rankings system measure?

In theory, the purpose of ranking law schools is to provide useful information to prospective law students. Rankings can provide different kinds of information for different purposes. Existing law school rankings seek to provide information that will help prospective law students decide where to matriculate, but objective rankings can provide useful information only if they measure factors that are salient to prospective law students.<sup>8</sup> Different factors are salient to different students, and we do not necessarily know which factors are actually salient to prospective law students and why.

By contrast, this Article provides the first subjective ranking of law schools. It describes a method of ranking law schools based entirely on the revealed preferences of matriculating students. Law school admission

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6. *See id.*; LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, TOTAL LSATS ADMINISTERED: COUNTS & PERCENT INCREASES BY YEAR (2017), <http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsats-administered>; LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, LSAC END-OF-YEAR SUMMARY: LSATS ADMINISTERED & CREDENTIAL ASSEMBLY SERVICE REGISTRATION (2017), <http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/lsac-volume-summary>; *see also* Aaron N. Taylor, *Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy*, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 321 (2015); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED: 1963–2012 (2012), [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal\\_education\\_and\\_admissions\\_to\\_the\\_bar/statistics/enrollment\\_degrees\\_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf); Natalie Kitroeff, *The Best Law Schools Are Attracting Fewer Law Students*, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2016, 11:18 AM), <https://bol.bna.com/the-best-law-schools-are-attracting-fewer-students/> (noting that among the very top law schools, only three law schools posted gains in applicants, while most saw their application pool shrink by an average of 20% between 2011 and 2015); Laira Martin, *Law Schools Admitting More Minorities to Combat Enrollment Drop*, NAT'L JURIST (Feb. 17., 2015, 1:22 PM), <http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/law-schools-admitting-more-minorities-combat-enrollment-drop> (describing the decline in law student academic credentials including median GPA and LSAT scores).

7. *See* Taylor, *supra* note 6; *see also* Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., *Analyzing the Effect of Increasing Financial Aid on Law Student Matriculation* (SSRN Working Paper, 2016), <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2872364> (finding that significant increases in a law school's median financial aid award results in modest increases in matriculant enrollment totals but that the marginal effect of increasing financial aid awards results in decreased matriculant yield rates, using year and peer reviewed rating fixed effects).

8. *See* Arewa, Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 4, at 1010.

depends almost entirely on an applicant's LSAT score and undergraduate GPA, and law schools compete to matriculate students with the highest possible combined scores.<sup>9</sup> Our method of ranking law schools assumes that the "best" law schools are the most successful at matriculating the most desirable students. Accordingly, this Article provides a "best law schools ranking" based exclusively on the LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs of matriculating students.

Objective rankings of law schools try to tell prospective law students which law school they should attend. This Article provides a subjective ranking of law schools by asking which law schools prospective law students actually choose to attend. This "revealed-preferences" method of ranking law schools may help identify which factors are actually salient to prospective law students. While it is roughly consistent with the *U.S. News* rankings as well as other rankings systems at the top and bottom, it diverges in many cases, occasionally quite significantly. This suggests that some law schools are better at gaming rankings systems than appealing to students and vice versa. In other words, objective ranking systems do not measure all of the factors that are salient to prospective students.

## I. LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS

Ideally, law school rankings provide salient information to prospective law students, employers, and law schools. Prospective law students rely on law school rankings to evaluate the marginal costs and benefits associated with an investment in legal education at a particular institution.<sup>10</sup> Employers rely on law school rankings in directing their investments in human capital.<sup>11</sup> Law schools use law school rankings as an external gauge of institutional success.<sup>12</sup> If law school rankings provide inaccurate

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9. See Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., *Crunching the Numbers: Peer Reputation and Value Added in the Age of the U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings* (SSRN Working Paper, 2015), [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2623728](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2623728) (finding a significant correlation between year-to-year quality assessment ratings of law schools ranked by *U.S. News & World Report*).

10. See Caron & Gely, *supra* note 1; Russell Korobkin, *Harnessing the Positive Power of Rankings: A Response to Posner and Sunstein*, 81 *IND. L.J.* 35, 40 (2006); Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, *Measuring Outcomes: Post-Graduation Measures of Success in the U.S. News & World Report Law School Rankings*, 83 *IND. L.J.* 791, 795 (2008).

11. See Bernard A. Burk, *What's New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century*, 41 *FLA. ST. U. L. REV.* 541, 558 (2013); Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 10, at 811–18; Richard E. Redding, "Where Did You Go to Law School?" *Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education*, 53 *J. LEGAL EDUC.* 594, 596 (2003); Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, *Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial Preferences Do?*, 75 *U. CHI. L. REV.* 649, 661 (2008); Jeffrey Evans Stake, *The Interplay between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead*, 81 *IND. L.J.* 229 (2006).

12. See Arewa, Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 4, at 1006–17; Ryan, Jr., *supra* note 9.

information about law school quality, they could decrease the ability of prospective law students, prospective employers, and law schools to make efficient choices.

However, different consumers use law school rankings in different ways. Prospective law students, employers, and law schools assign different weights to different factors. The usefulness of a law school ranking system depends not only on which factors it considers, but also on its intended audience. The intended audience of a rankings system is typically prospective law students.<sup>13</sup> So, the usefulness of a rankings system depends primarily on whether it provides information about factors that are salient to prospective law students.

#### A. *The U.S. News Rankings*

The *U.S. News* rankings are based on a composite score of several factors, which the magazine periodically reweights in an effort to improve its rankings.<sup>14</sup> Among other things, the *U.S. News* rankings consider: (1) “quality assessment,” a proxy for reputational quality based on surveys distributed to certain law professors and legal professionals; (2) “selectivity,” or the entrance credentials of matriculants, including median undergraduate GPA and median LSAT scores, as well as acceptance rates; (3) “placement success,” or post-graduation outcomes, such as bar passage and employment rates; and (4) “faculty resources,” or student–faculty ratio, per student expenditures, and library size.<sup>15</sup> In practice, the single most important factor in the *U.S. News* methodology is the quality assessment, or peer-review category, which is the subject of two chief criticisms.<sup>16</sup> First, ratings in this category are highly time-invariant; year-to-year quality assessment ratings are correlated better than 95% with the last five years’ ratings.<sup>17</sup> Because these ratings are not responsive to actual changes in quality at a given law school from year to year, this is an indication that the *U.S. News*’ quality assessment may not be a reliable measurement of what

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13. See Arewa, Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 4, at 1006–17; Stake, *supra* note 11, at 244–45.

14. See Ehrenberg, *supra* note 2, at 147; Morse & Hines, *supra* note 4.

15. While the changing *U.S. News* methodology weighting is likely to be an important determinant of a law school’s *U.S. News* rank, a chronicling of these changes is beyond the scope of this study. For a more detailed history of these changes, see Black & Caron, *supra* note 1, at 86–89; Ehrenberg, *supra* note 2, at 147; Brian Leiter, *How to Rank Law Schools*, 81 *IND. L.J.* 47 (2006); Morse & Hines, *supra* note 4.

16. See Jones, *supra* note 4, at 723.

17. See, e.g., Ryan, Jr., *supra* note 9 (finding significant correlation between year-to-year quality assessment ratings of law schools ranked by *U.S. News & World Report*); see also Robert Anderson, *Predicting the Future of US News Law School Rankings with Revealed Preferences Rankings?* (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:34 PM), <http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2017/09/predicting-the-future-of-us-news-with-revealed-preference-rankings.html>.

it purports to measure. Second, the category accounts for 40% of a law school's total score,<sup>18</sup> and yet this rating is determined subjectively by academics and lawyers<sup>19</sup> who, in determining their ratings, may not give as much consideration to the factors that are salient to students. Whatever the reason, critics agree that the *U.S. News* methodology's heavy reliance on quality assessment causes stagnation, because quality assessment is remarkably "sticky," causing rankings to "echo" in the following year.<sup>20</sup>

### B. Alternative Rankings

Many scholars have criticized the *U.S. News* law school rankings and proposed alternative rankings systems.<sup>21</sup> For example, Black and Caron suggested an alternative to the *U.S. News* ranking using a measurement of a law faculty's Social Science Research Network (SSRN) scholarship output to substitute for the law school's peer assessment score, drawing on the literature linking research productivity and perceptions of educational quality.<sup>22</sup> While intriguing, their model is more accurately a measure of research quality than of institutional quality.<sup>23</sup>

Other studies have examined the reputational peer review scores assigned to law schools and have found indications of ranking stagnation amidst a changing set of categorical weights employed in the *U.S. News* methodology. Principally, these studies offer descriptive insight into peer assessment evaluations in legal education<sup>24</sup> and the legal job market facing new law graduates.<sup>25</sup> When combined with earlier scholarship on ranking systems, these studies help show what rankings do well and also where rankings can fail. However, no study to date has adequately addressed the alarming decrease in law school applications, which has forced law schools

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18. See Arewa, Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 4, at 994.

19. See Morse & Hines, *supra* note 4.

20. See Arewa, Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 4, at 994; Black & Caron, *supra* note 1, at 86–89; Wendy Nelson Espeland & Michael Sauder, *Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds*, 113 AM. J. SOC. 1, 13–14 (2007); Jones, *supra* note 4, at 787–90; Leiter, *supra* note 15, at 51; Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 10, at 820–21; Stake, *supra* note 11, at 254–55.

21. See Caron & Gely, *supra* note 1, at 1517–24; Louis H. Pollak, *Why Trying to Rank Law Schools Numerically Is a Non-Productive Undertaking: An Article on the U.S. News & World Report 2009 List of "The Top 100 Schools"*, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 52, 54 (2009); Nancy B. Rapoport, *Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & World Report Shouldn't Want to be Compared to Time and Newsweek—or The New Yorker*, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1101 (1999).

22. See Black & Caron, *supra* note 1; see also David D. Dill & Maarja Soo, *Academic Quality, League Tables, and Public Policy: A Cross-National Analysis of University Ranking Systems*, 49 J. HIGHER EDUC. 495 (2005); Stephen G. Grunig, *Research, Reputation, and Resources: The Effect of Research Activity on Perceptions of Undergraduate Education and Institutional Resource Acquisition*, 68 J. HIGHER EDUC. 17 (1997).

23. See Dill & Soo, *supra* note 22, at 505–06; Ehrenberg, *supra* note 2.

24. See Jones, *supra* note 4, at 726–33.

25. See Burk, *supra* note 11.

to admit students with lower GPAs and LSATs in order to fill their classes.<sup>26</sup> As the market for legal education changes, existing law school rankings may become increasingly meaningless, as the factors they measure diverge from the factors that matter to prospective law students.

Other rankings systems are based on outcomes. For example, *Above the Law* has created a popular law school rankings system based primarily on tuition cost and employment.<sup>27</sup> It is reasonable to assume that predicted economic outcomes are salient to prospective students.

## II. A CONSUMER'S PREFERENCE APPROACH

The shift in the market for legal education from a surplus to a shortage of prospective students suggests a need for a new approach to ranking law schools. Legal education is a buyer's market. Prospective law students have more and better choices, as well as access to more and better information about law schools, both from the schools themselves and from third-party sources. Law schools at every quality level compete to attract the prospective students with the highest stats. Oddly, few empirical studies have examined the revealed preferences of matriculating students.<sup>28</sup>

The participants in the market for legal education need law school rankings systems to provide a different kind of information and answer a different question than they have in the past: which law schools attract the most competitive students and why? Because law school admissions decisions are based almost exclusively on an applicant's undergraduate GPA and LSAT score,<sup>29</sup> students with similar score profiles will have similar choices of potential law schools. In effect, the score is a prospective student's "currency," because it determines which products that student can purchase. By identifying which law schools matriculated the students with the highest scores, we can identify the "best" law schools from the perspective of the consumers of legal education. The law school that matriculates the students with the highest scores is *ipso facto* the "best,"

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26. Ry Rivard, *Lowering the Bar: More Law Schools are Admitting Less Qualified Students*, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 16, 2015), <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-students-many-may-not-have-admitted-past>; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION (2014), [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional\\_responsibility/report\\_and\\_recommendations\\_of\\_aba\\_task\\_force.authcheckdam.pdf](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/report_and_recommendations_of_aba_task_force.authcheckdam.pdf) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].

27. *See Top 50 Law Schools*, ABOVE THE LAW, <http://abovethelaw.com/law-school-rankings/top-law-schools/> (last visited Oct. 10, 2017).

28. *See* Morriss & Henderson, *supra* note 10, at 827; Jason Solomon, *How to Compare Value Added Across Law Schools*, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 14, 2008, 9:55 AM), <http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/07/last-week-i-mad.html>.

29. *See* Ryan, Jr., *supra* note 9.

and the law school that matriculates the students with the lowest scores is *ipso facto* the “worst,” with a range in between.

This consumer preference method of ranking law schools measures the subjective preferences of prospective students, rather than predetermined objective factors like other rankings systems. The problem with measuring objective factors is that those factors may not be salient to actual prospective law students. Prospective law students want information about factors that are salient to their preferences, and law schools want information about how to attract students. Law school rankings systems that measure objective factors may provide unhelpful information to prospective students by failing to measure salient factors, and may create an incentive for law schools to compete on factors that are not salient to students. By contrast, a revealed-preferences method of ranking law schools asks only what prospective students actually want, rather than what they should want.

### III. THE DATA

To rank law schools based on the underlying “purchasing-power” of their students, this Article employs the American Bar Association (ABA) Rule 509 Required Disclosures, a loose, panel dataset comprising an array of institutional characteristics of law schools, including many of the same characteristics contemplated by the *U.S. News*’ methodology.<sup>30</sup> The data are reported annually by the institutions themselves and though not conducive to casual perusal, the dataset is intended to provide consumer and public transparency.<sup>31</sup> The data used in this study was collected from 2011 through 2016 by each accredited law school in the country as reported to the ABA, the accrediting body for all American law schools.<sup>32</sup> The authors accessed this portal and merged available ABA Rule 509 Disclosure data by accredited institution, by year, as well as available aggregate data. Finally, the *U.S. News* and *Above the Law* rankings were hand-coded and mapped onto the existing dataset.

When compiled from the multiple component datasets, the full data set surveys all 204 nationally-accredited and provisionally-accredited law schools (coded as observations by year in the complete data set) and records their institutional responses to over 500 variables relating to key metrics of equal access, student characteristics and outcomes, curriculum,

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30. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (2016), [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal\\_education/Standards/2016\\_2017\\_aba\\_standards\\_and\\_rules\\_of\\_procedure.authcheckdam.pdf](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2016_2017_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure.authcheckdam.pdf) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]; TASK FORCE, *supra* note 26.

31. See ABA STANDARDS, *supra* note 30.

32. See *id.*

faculty demographics, institutional resources, as well as their *U.S. News* rankings and peer assessments and the *Above the Law* rankings. This study employs a much smaller subset of variables from the full data set that are linked to quality and value against the same number of observations. Because this Article focuses solely on the reported quartile measures of GPA and LSAT as a measure of a law school's matriculant buying power, in total, this data set comprises six variables linked to matriculating students' GPAs and LSATs per year per institution from 2011 through 2016. We acknowledge the limitations of these data, however, in not fully contemplating the transfer market for rising second-year law (2L) students. Given that law schools are not required to report this information,<sup>33</sup> these data are unavailable, and our results should be read as an indicator of the consumer preferences of law students at the time of initial matriculation. We now offer a revealed-preferences approach to ranking law schools on the basis of the GPA and LSAT credentials of the entering law students they matriculate.

#### IV. THE REVEALED-PREFERENCES RANKINGS

Law schools in our ranking were assigned a scaled desirability index score based on the "purchasing power" of their matriculating students. This index score was summed from six equal parts: a scaled 75th percentile GPA, a scaled median GPA, a scaled 25th percentile GPA, a scaled 75th percentile LSAT, a scaled median LSAT, and a scaled 25th percentile LSAT—each given one-sixth weight to construct the index. The consumer preference rankings we constructed from these index scores, proffered in the appendix below, surprised us because there are consistencies between this ranking system and previous years' peer review ratings, particularly among the top law schools. However, there are several notable exceptions, a few of which are detailed below, and the full rankings are published in the appendix at Table 1.

First, our rankings shake up the perennial contenders outside of the top-10. For example, the "T-14s" (top-14) are disrupted, with Texas falling on the outside of the coveted territory, while Georgetown narrowly scraped back into the top-14. Several public universities in the South tend to perform better in this ranking than their *U.S. News* ranking, such as Alabama, William & Mary, and Georgia, all of which make our top-25. Midwestern bluebloods like Washington University and Iowa, however, both slid outside the top-20, falling to 29 and 31, respectively, while Minnesota crept into the top-20. Boston College tumbled from 26 in the

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33. *Id.*

*U.S. News* rankings to 42 in our rankings, and other traditionally top-30 schools such as Arizona State, Ohio State, and Wisconsin, and newcomer UC-Irvine, were on the outside looking in.

There were some surprising additions to the top-25, such as BYU, and top-35, such as SMU and George Mason, all of which are usually rated in the middle of the top-100 law schools by *U.S. News*. Also, perennial top-40 schools were also impacted, like North Carolina, which fell to 45, and Washington & Lee fell precipitously to 65. Florida State, Utah, and Maryland were also ousted from the top-50. Notable newcomers to the top-50 include Nebraska, Northeastern, and Pepperdine.

There was considerable within-tier movement among the next tier of schools and a few fresh faces. San Diego, Villanova, and Penn State each cracked the top-75, while Seton Hall, Tulane, and Kentucky dropped to the back of or outside the top-75. However, Connecticut and Rutgers nearly fell out of the top-100 in our rankings, despite being rated by *U.S. News* in the top-65. Meanwhile, Florida International, Wayne State, and New Hampshire, which were each ranked at 100 by *U.S. News*, and Belmont, which is not ranked by *U.S. News*, all made their way well into the top-100. While Texas A&M and Quinnipiac made significant strides to check in at 82 and 96, respectively, American slid precipitously back to 87. Notable schools that fell outside the top-100 include Chicago-Kent, Brooklyn, Loyola Chicago, Syracuse, Stetson, Hawaii, West Virginia, Marquette, and Louisville. Several schools rated by *U.S. News* in the top-150 fell below that rating in our rankings, such as: Howard, Baltimore, Willamette, Loyola New Orleans, Vermont, Widener Commonwealth, and Northern Illinois.

Overall, this revealed-preferences ranking system departs from the *U.S. News* and *Above the Law* rankings system at statistically significant levels. Accordingly, it may be a preferable approach to measure law school quality from the perspective of prospective students. It suggests that objective rankings may not measure all of the factors that are salient to prospective law students, including the law school's religious or ideological affiliation. For example, several law schools with a strong religious identity like Brigham Young, Pepperdine, and Liberty significantly outperform their *U.S. News* and *Above the Law* rankings, suggesting that this is a highly salient factor to some students. George Mason's ideological identity may be a very salient factor for other students. Other discrepancies may also reflect the failure of objective rankings to incorporate or accurately measure salient factors for students.

While law is an increasingly global profession, many prospective law students decide which school to attend based on the geographic location of the school, and many law schools compete for law students at the regional level. For instance, law schools like SMU and Texas A&M benefit from being the only accredited law schools in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex,

a factor that may be salient to students wishing to study law in the country's fourth-largest metropolitan area, while other major metropolitan areas—New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—are saturated with law schools that engage in more vigorous competition for the students who want to study law in those geographical areas. Accordingly, we adapt our revealed preferences to the four U.S. Census Bureau regions—Northeast, Midwest, South, and West—in order to demonstrate the regional ordering of law schools according to a revealed-preferences approach. These results are offered in the appendix at Tables 2–5.

#### CONCLUSION

Reliable indicators of quality are essential to inform market participants' expectations but should be responsive enough to changes in quality and value that they do not become synonymous with participants' expectations.<sup>34</sup> Nearly every ranking system must make tradeoffs between simplicity and accuracy of measurement. We believe this ranking system combines both: its construction from essentially two student-level characteristics is remarkably simple, yet it accurately operationalizes and measures a consumer preference. As our rankings indicate, while there are similarities between the *U.S. News* peer review ratings and the rankings we offer, there are many notable discrepancies. The *U.S. News*' methodology relies heavily on peer review ratings, while our rankings rely instead on a measure of law student choice, a difference which some in the academy have suggested corresponds with lagging and leading indicators of quality, respectively.<sup>35</sup> The rankings we proffer below form the basis of a consumer preference model and thus present a fundamentally improved ranking alternative for prospective students, not to mention the public, who wish to see where the best students are choosing to attend law school.

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34. See Rapoport, *supra* note 21, at 1098; Redding, *supra* note 11, at 594; Solomon, *supra* note 28.

35. See, e.g., Anderson, *supra* note 17.

## APPENDIX

TABLE 1: THE 2017 REVEALED-PREFERENCES (RP) RANKINGS

<b>RP RANK (2017)</b>	<b>LAW SCHOOL</b>	<b>INDEX (2017)</b>	<b>US NEWS RANK (2017)</b>	<b>ATL RANK (2016)</b>
1	YALE UNIVERSITY	0.9650463	1	1
2	HARVARD UNIVERSITY	0.9603704	3	5
3	STANFORD UNIVERSITY	0.9561574	2	2
4	CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9528704	4	3
5	NEW YORK UNIVERSITY	0.9414352	6	15
6	PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9406481	7	4
7	COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY	0.9371759	5	11
8	VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9357408	8	6
9	DUKE UNIVERSITY	0.9347685	10	7
10	CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9331945	12	10
11	MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9309722	8	13
12	NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY	0.9276389	10	8
13	CORNELL UNIVERSITY	0.9252778	13	9
14	GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY	0.9251852	15	21
15	CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9223611	15	19

16	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9218981	19	NR
17	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	0.9206018	17	14
18	TEXAS-AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9164352	14	12
19	MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9156944	23	34
20	BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY	0.9155555	46	40
21	ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9153241	26	26
22	EMORY UNIVERSITY	0.9122685	22	38
23	BOSTON UNIVERSITY	0.910787	23	17
24	WILLIAM & MARY, COLLEGE OF	0.9105555	41	23
25	GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9080555	30	23
26	NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9067593	20	20
27	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	0.9057871	30	33
28	WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF	0.9036574	30	39
29	WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	0.9031019	18	22
30	COLORADO-BOULDER, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8983796	36	NR
31	IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.897037	20	18
32	GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY	0.8964815	51	NR
33	ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY	0.895463	25	50
34	INDIANA UNIVERSITY-	0.8954167	30	48

## BLOOMINGTON

35	SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY	0.8951852	46	29
36	FORDHAM UNIVERSITY	0.8931019	36	NR
37	NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8930092	57	NR
38	OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY	0.8919907	30	27
39	CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8910185	28	NR
40	CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8886574	39	NR
41	FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8875	41	30
42	BOSTON COLLEGE	0.8871759	26	16
43	WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY	0.8864352	36	47
44	WISCONSIN-MADISON, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8861111	30	NR
45	NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8846296	39	27
46	ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8828241	44	31
47	PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY	0.8818982	72	NR
48	NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	0.8817593	65	NR
49	BAYLOR UNIVERSITY	0.8814815	51	32
50	ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8814352	48	42
51	TENNESSEE-KNOXVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8812037	57	NR
52	FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY	0.8807408	48	NR
53	HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8805093	54	41

54	TEMPLE UNIVERSITY	0.8792593	53	46
55	UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8785648	44	NR
56	RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8784259	57	48
57	YESHIVA UNIVERSITY	0.8774537	65	NR
58	ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY	0.8762037	72	NR
59	LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY	0.8758333	65	NR
60	CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY	0.8739815	62	NR
61	MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF	0.873287	48	NR
62	SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8712963	77	NR
63	VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY	0.8709259	77	NR
64	NEVADA-LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8701852	62	NR
65	WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY	0.8699074	28	NR
66	OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8697685	72	NR
67	CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8686574	54	NR
68	MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8681945	65	42
69	FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY	0.8680556	100	NR
70	WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY	0.8679166	100	NR
71	CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8677315	72	NR
72	SETON HALL UNIVERSITY	0.8675463	57	35

(Tie)

72 (Tie)	PENN STATE UNIVERSITY- UNIVERSITY PARK	0.8675463	82	NR
74	TULANE UNIVERSITY	0.8671296	51	NR
75	PENN STATE UNIVERSITY- DICKINSON LAW	0.8663889	65	NR
76	GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY	0.8658797	65	44
77	KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8636111	57	NR
78	OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8618519	86	NR
79	KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8610648	65	NR
80	MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY	0.8600926	96	NR
81	ARKANSAS- FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8598611	77	NR
82	NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8593519	100	NR
82	TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY	0.8593519	92	NR
84	BELMONT UNIVERSITY	0.8588889	NR	NR
85	MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8587037	77	NR
86	DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8572685	76	NR
87	AMERICAN UNIVERSITY	0.8569908	86	NR
88	NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8567593	77	36
89	PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8565741	82	NR
90	SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8561111	88	NR
91	LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE	0.8558796	100	NR

92	CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8550926	54	NR
93	ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY	0.8550463	88	NR
94	RUTGERS UNIVERSITY	0.8546296	62	NR
95	MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8544444	109	NR
96	QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE	0.8540741	127	NR
97	STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO	0.8539352	106	NR
98	INDIANA UNIVERSITY- INDIANAPOLIS	0.8538426	88	NR
99	TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.852037	82	NR
100	LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY	0.8512963	96	42
101	WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8511574	112	NR
102	CHICAGO-KENT / ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY	0.8510648	92	NR
103	BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL	0.8505093	88	NR
104	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY- CHICAGO	0.8486111	82	NR
105	SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY	0.8474537	92	NR
106	LIBERTY UNIVERSITY	0.8468981	NR	NR
107	ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (MN)	0.8457407	120	NR
108	DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY	0.8456482	127	NR
109	MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8453704	120	NR
110	SEATTLE UNIVERSITY	0.8449537	120	NR
111	STETSON UNIVERSITY	0.8448611	96	NR

112	MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8425463	112	NR
113	HAWAII-MANOA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8425	100	NR
114	WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY	0.8421759	96	NR
115	REGENT UNIVERSITY	0.8421296	NR	NR
116	DREXEL UNIVERSITY	0.8402778	112	NR
117	DRAKE UNIVERSITY	0.8395833	106	NR
118	MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY	0.8394907	100	NR
119	CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY	0.83875	127	NR
120	TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8384722	132	NR
121	CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA	0.8379167	106	NR
122	HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY	0.8375926	118	NR
123	PUERTO RICO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8375463	NR	NR
124	TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY	0.8371759	118	NR
125	CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY	0.8358796	134	NR
126	CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY	0.8358333	NR	NR
127	AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF	0.835463	134	NR
128	ALBANY LAW SCHOOL	0.8337963	109	NR
129	WASHBURN UNIVERSITY	0.8334723	127	NR
130	ARKANSAS-LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8332871	134	NR
131	NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL	0.8326389	112	NR
132	CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY	0.8318055	120	NR
133	SAMFORD UNIVERSITY	0.8313889	147	NR

134	SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8306944	142	NR
135	PACE UNIVERSITY	0.8306019	120	NR
136	CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK	0.8302315	127	NR
137	LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8286574	92	NR
138	MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8282871	140	NR
139	GONZAGA UNIVERSITY	0.8279167	112	NR
140	MERCER UNIVERSITY	0.8274537	134	NR
141	MITCHELL-HAMLIN	0.8263426	NR	NR
142	PACIFIC, UNIVERSITY OF THE	0.8255556	142	NR
143	SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL	0.8244907	NR	NR
144	SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY	0.8236111	132	NR
145	DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8231481	NR	NR
146	MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8228704	139	NR
147	IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8224537	109	NR
148	OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY	0.8222685	NR	NR
149	NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8218055	142	NR
150	SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY	0.8207408	140	NR
151	NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW	0.8203241	NR	NR
152	HOWARD UNIVERSITY	0.8200926	120	NR
153	BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8181481	112	NR

154	WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY	0.817037	142	NR
155	CAPITAL UNIVERSITY	0.8159722	NR	NR
156	NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY	0.8140278	NR	NR
157	ELON UNIVERSITY	0.8137037	NR	NR
158	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY- NEW ORLEANS	0.8123148	142	NR
159	NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY	0.8116667	NR	NR
160	VERMONT LAW SCHOOL	0.8105093	134	NR
161	DEPAUL UNIVERSITY	0.810463	120	NR
162	CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW	0.8076389	NR	NR
163	ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY	0.8058797	NR	NR
164	SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW	0.8044444	NR	NR
165	INDIANA TECH	0.8043056	NR	NR
166	DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8037963	NR	NR
167	SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF	0.8036111	NR	NR
168	NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	0.8027315	NR	NR
169	WIDENER UNIVERSITY- HARRISBURG	0.7995833	148	NR
170	WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY	0.7981945	NR	NR
171	LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY	0.7975463	NR	NR
172	WIDENER UNIVERSITY- WILMINGTON	0.7965278	NR	NR

173	INTER AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO	0.7960648	NR	NR
174	MASSACHUSETTS- DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF	0.7959722	NR	NR
175	AVE MARIA SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7958333	NR	NR
176	ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY	0.7957407	NR	NR
177	JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL-CHICAGO	0.7956945	NR	NR
178	NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY	0.7923611	148	NR
179	OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY	0.7906018	NR	NR
180	WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW	0.7892593	NR	NR
181	TOURO COLLEGE	0.7886111	NR	NR
182	MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE OF LAW	0.7885648	NR	NR
183	VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY	0.7881019	NR	NR
184	ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (FL)	0.7875926	NR	NR
185	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF THE	0.7875	NR	NR
186	FLORIDA A&M SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7866204	NR	NR
187	TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY	0.7860185	NR	NR
188	JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL-ATLANTA	0.7856944	NR	NR
189	BARRY UNIVERSITY	0.7841204	NR	NR
190	CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY	0.7816204	NR	NR

191	CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7799537	NR	NR
192	GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY	0.7793056	NR	NR
193	LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF	0.7757407	NR	NR
194	SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY- CARBONDALE	0.7739352	NR	NR
195	FAULKNER UNIVERSITY	0.7737037	NR	NR
196	PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO	0.7721297	NR	NR
197	SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER	0.7716666	NR	NR
198	FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7647685	NR	NR
199	ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL	0.7640741	NR	NR
200	WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL	0.7614815	NR	NR
201	THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7598148	NR	NR
202	THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL	0.7559722	NR	NR
203	APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7518982	NR	NR
204	CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW	0.7480093	NR	NR

**TABLE 2: 2017 REGIONAL RANKINGS (NORTHEAST REGION)**

<b>Region Rank</b>	<b>Law School</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Overall Rank</b>
1	YALE UNIVERSITY	Connecticut	0.9650463	1
2	HARVARD UNIVERSITY	Massachusetts	0.9603704	2
3	NEW YORK UNIVERSITY	New York	0.9414352	5
4	PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF	Pennsylvania	0.9406481	6
5	COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY	New York	0.9371759	7
6	CORNELL UNIVERSITY	New York	0.9252778	13
7	BOSTON UNIVERSITY	Massachusetts	0.910787	23
8	FORDHAM UNIVERSITY	New York	0.8931019	36
9	BOSTON COLLEGE	Massachusetts	0.8871759	42
10	NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	Massachusetts	0.8817593	48
11	TEMPLE UNIVERSITY	Pennsylvania	0.8792593	54
12	YESHIVA UNIVERSITY	New York	0.8774537	57
13	ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY	New York	0.8762037	58
14	VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY	Pennsylvania	0.8709259	63
15	SETON HALL UNIVERSITY	New Jersey	0.8675463	72
16	PENN STATE	Pennsylvania	0.8675463	72

	UNIVERSITY- UNIVERSITY PARK			
17	PENN STATE UNIVERSITY- DICKINSON LAW	Pennsylvania	0.8663889	75
18	NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF	New Hampshire	0.8593519	82
19	PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF	Pennsylvania	0.8565741	89
20	CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF	Connecticut	0.8550926	92
21	RUTGERS UNIVERSITY	New Jersey	0.8546296	94
22	QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE	Connecticut	0.8540741	96
23	STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO	New York	0.8539352	97
24	BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL	New York	0.8505093	103
25	SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY	New York	0.8474537	105
26	DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY	Pennsylvania	0.8456482	108
27	DREXEL UNIVERSITY	Pennsylvania	0.8402778	116
28	HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY	New York	0.8375926	122
29	PUERTO RICO, UNIVERSITY OF	Puerto Rico	0.8375463	123
30	ALBANY LAW SCHOOL	New York	0.8337963	128
31	NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL	New York	0.8326389	131
32	PACE UNIVERSITY	New York	0.8306019	135

33	CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK	New York	0.8302315	136
34	MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF	Maine	0.8228704	146
35	SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY	Massachusetts	0.8207408	150
36	NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW	Massachusetts	0.8203241	151
37	VERMONT LAW SCHOOL	Vermont	0.8105093	160
38	ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY	Rhode Island	0.8058797	163
39	WIDENER UNIVERSITY- HARRISBURG	Pennsylvania	0.7995833	169
40	WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY	Massachusetts	0.7981945	170
41	INTER AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO	Puerto Rico	0.7960648	173
42	MASSACHUSETTS- DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF	Massachusetts	0.7959722	174
43	TOURO COLLEGE	New York	0.7886111	181
44	PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO	Puerto Rico	0.7721297	196

**TABLE 3: 2017 REGIONAL RANKINGS (MIDWEST REGION)**

<b>Region Rank</b>	<b>Law School</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Overall Rank</b>
1	CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF	Illinois	0.9528704	4
2	MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF	Michigan	0.9309722	11
3	NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY	Illinois	0.9276389	12
4	MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	Minnesota	0.9156944	19
5	NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF	Indiana	0.9067593	26
6	WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	Missouri	0.9031019	29
7	IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF	Iowa	0.897037	31
8	INDIANA UNIVERSITY-BLOOMINGTON	Indiana	0.8954167	34
9	NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, UNIVERSITY OF	Nebraska	0.8930092	37
10	OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY	Ohio	0.8919907	38
11	WISCONSIN-MADISON, UNIVERSITY OF	Wisconsin	0.8861111	44
12	ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF	Illinois	0.8828241	46
13	CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY	Ohio	0.8739815	60
14	MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF	Missouri	0.8681945	68

15	WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY	Michigan	0.8679166	70
16	CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF	Ohio	0.8677315	71
17	KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF	Kansas	0.8610648	79
18	MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY	Michigan	0.8600926	80
19	ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY	Missouri	0.8550463	93
20	INDIANA UNIVERSITY- INDIANAPOLIS	Indiana	0.8538426	98
21	CHICAGO-KENT / IIT	Illinois	0.8510648	102
22	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY- CHICAGO	Illinois	0.8486111	104
23	ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (MN)	Minnesota	0.8457407	107
24	MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF	Missouri	0.8425463	112
25	DRAKE UNIVERSITY	Iowa	0.8395833	117
26	MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY	Wisconsin	0.8394907	118
27	CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY	Ohio	0.83875	119
28	TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF	Ohio	0.8384722	120
29	AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF	Ohio	0.835463	127
30	WASHBURN UNIVERSITY	Kansas	0.8334723	129
31	CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY	Nebraska	0.8318055	132
32	SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	South Dakota	0.8306944	134

33	MITCHELL-HAMLIN	Minnesota	0.8263426	141
34	DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF	Michigan	0.8231481	145
35	OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY	Ohio	0.8222685	148
36	NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF	North Dakota	0.8218055	149
37	CAPITAL UNIVERSITY	Ohio	0.8159722	155
38	DEPAUL UNIVERSITY	Illinois	0.810463	161
39	INDIANA TECH	Indiana	0.8043056	165
40	DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF	Ohio	0.8037963	166
41	JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL-CHICAGO	Illinois	0.7956945	177
42	NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY	Illinois	0.7923611	178
43	VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY	Indiana	0.7881019	183
44	SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY- CARBONDALE	Illinois	0.7739352	194
45	THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL	Michigan	0.7559722	202

**TABLE 4: 2017 REGIONAL RANKINGS (SOUTH REGION)**

<b>Region Rank</b>	<b>Law School</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Overall Rank</b>
1	VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF	Virginia	0.9357408	8
2	DUKE UNIVERSITY	North Carolina	0.9347685	9
3	GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY	District of Columbia	0.9251852	14
4	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	Tennessee	0.9206018	17
5	TEXAS-AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF	Texas	0.9164352	18
6	ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF	Alabama	0.9153241	21
7	EMORY UNIVERSITY	Georgia	0.9122685	22
8	WILLIAM & MARY, COLLEGE OF	Virginia	0.9105555	24
9	GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF	Georgia	0.9080555	25
10	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY	District of Columbia	0.9057871	27
11	GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY	Virginia	0.8964815	32
12	SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY	Texas	0.8951852	35
13	FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF	Florida	0.8875	41
14	WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY	North Carolina	0.8864352	43

15	NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	North Carolina	0.8846296	45
16	BAYLOR UNIVERSITY	Texas	0.8814815	49
17	TENNESSEE- KNOXVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	Tennessee	0.8812037	51
18	FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY	Florida	0.8807408	52
19	HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF	Texas	0.8805093	53
20	RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF	Virginia	0.8784259	56
21	MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF	Maryland	0.873287	61
22	WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY	Virginia	0.8699074	65
23	OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF	Oklahoma	0.8697685	66
24	FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY	Florida	0.8680556	69
25	TULANE UNIVERSITY	Louisiana	0.8671296	74
26	GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY	Georgia	0.8658797	76
27	KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF	Kentucky	0.8636111	77
28	ARKANSAS- FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	Arkansas	0.8598611	81
29	TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY	Texas	0.8593519	82
30	BELMONT UNIVERSITY	Tennessee	0.8588889	84

31	MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF	Florida	0.8587037	85
32	AMERICAN UNIVERSITY	District of Columbia	0.8569908	87
33	SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF	South Carolina	0.8561111	90
34	MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF	Mississippi	0.8544444	95
35	TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF	Oklahoma	0.852037	99
36	LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY	Louisiana	0.8512963	100
37	LIBERTY UNIVERSITY	Virginia	0.8468981	106
38	STETSON UNIVERSITY	Florida	0.8448611	111
39	WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY	West Virginia	0.8421759	114
40	REGENT UNIVERSITY	Virginia	0.8421296	115
41	CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA	District of Columbia	0.8379167	121
42	TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY	Texas	0.8371759	124
43	CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY	North Carolina	0.8358333	126
44	ARKANSAS-LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF	Arkansas	0.8332871	130
45	SAMFORD UNIVERSITY	Alabama	0.8313889	133
46	LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF	Kentucky	0.8286574	137
47	MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF	Tennessee	0.8282871	138

48	MERCER UNIVERSITY	Georgia	0.8274537	140
49	HOWARD UNIVERSITY	District of Columbia	0.8200926	152
50	BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF	Maryland	0.8181481	153
51	NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY	Kentucky	0.8140278	156
52	ELON UNIVERSITY	North Carolina	0.8137037	157
53	LOYOLA UNIVERSITY- NEW ORLEANS	Louisiana	0.8123148	158
54	NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIV	North Carolina	0.8116667	159
55	SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW	Texas	0.8044444	164
56	NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY	Florida	0.8027315	168
57	LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY	Tennessee	0.7975463	171
58	WIDENER UNIVERSITY- WILMINGTON	Delaware	0.7965278	172
59	AVE MARIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW	Florida	0.7958333	175
60	ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY	Texas	0.7957407	176
61	OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY	Oklahoma	0.7906018	179
62	MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE OF LAW	Mississippi	0.7885648	182

63	ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (FL)	Florida	0.7875926	184
64	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF THE	District of Columbia	0.7875	185
65	FLORIDA A&M SCHOOL OF LAW	Florida	0.7866204	186
66	TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY	Texas	0.7860185	187
67	JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL-ATLANTA	Georgia	0.7856944	188
68	BARRY UNIVERSITY	Florida	0.7841204	189
69	CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW	South Carolina	0.7799537	191
70	FAULKNER UNIVERSITY	Alabama	0.7737037	195
71	SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER	Louisiana	0.7716666	197
72	FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW	Florida	0.7647685	198
73	APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW	Virginia	0.7518982	203
74	CHARLOTTE SCHOOL OF LAW	North Carolina	0.7480093	204

**TABLE 5: 2017 REGIONAL RANKINGS (WEST REGION)**

<b>Region Rank</b>	<b>Law School</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Overall Rank</b>
1	STANFORD UNIVERSITY	California	0.9561574	3
2	CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.9331945	10
3	CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.9223611	15
4	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.9218981	16
5	BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY	Utah	0.9155555	20
6	WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF	Washington	0.9036574	28
7	COLORADO-BOULDER, UNIVERSITY OF	Colorado	0.8983796	30
8	ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY	Arizona	0.895463	33
9	CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.8910185	39
10	CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.8886574	40
11	PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY	California	0.8818982	47
12	ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF	Arizona	0.8814352	50
13	UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF	Utah	0.8785648	55

14	LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY	California	0.8758333	59
15	SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.8712963	62
16	NEVADA-LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF	Nevada	0.8701852	64
17	CALIFORNIA- HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.8686574	67
18	OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF	Oregon	0.8618519	78
19	DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF	Colorado	0.8572685	86
20	NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF	New Mexico	0.8567593	88
21	LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE	Oregon	0.8558796	91
22	WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF	Wyoming	0.8511574	101
23	MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF	Montana	0.8453704	109
24	SEATTLE UNIVERSITY	Washington	0.8449537	110
25	HAWAII-MANOA, UNIVERSITY OF	Hawaii	0.8425	113
26	CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY	California	0.8358796	125
27	GONZAGA UNIVERSITY	Washington	0.8279167	139
28	PACIFIC, UNIVERSITY OF THE	California	0.8255556	142
29	SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL	California	0.8244907	143

30	SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY	California	0.8236111	144
31	IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF	Idaho	0.8224537	147
32	WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY	Oregon	0.817037	154
33	CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW	California	0.8076389	162
34	SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.8036111	167
35	WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW	California	0.7892593	180
36	CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY	Idaho	0.7816204	190
37	GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY	California	0.7793056	192
38	LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF	California	0.7757407	193
39	ARIZONA SUMMIT LAW SCHOOL	Arizona	0.7640741	199
40	WHITTIER LAW SCHOOL	California	0.7614815	200
41	THOMAS JEFFERSON SCHOOL OF LAW	California	0.7598148	201

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